

Web Version of
A Bayesian Approach to Estimation of Dynamic Models
with Small and Large Number of Heterogeneous Players
and Latent Serially Correlated States *

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Abstract

The web version of the paper includes simulation results in Subsection 7.1 that are not in the submitted version of the paper and describes the solution method for the entry game with a small number of players of Subsection 6.1 in the Appendix.

We propose a Bayesian approach to estimating dynamic models that can have state variables that are latent, serially correlated, and heterogeneous. Our approach employs sequential importance sampling and is based on deriving an unbiased estimate of the likelihood within a Metropolis chain. Under fairly weak regularity conditions unbiasedness guarantees that the stationary density of the chain is the exact posterior, not an approximation. Results are verified by Monte Carlo simulation using two examples. The first is a dynamic game of entry involving a small number of firms whose heterogeneity is based on their current costs due to feedback through capacity constraints arising from past entry. The second is an Ericson-Pakes (1995) style game with a large number of firms whose heterogeneity is based on the quality of their products with firms competing through investment in product quality that affects their market share and profitability. Our approach facilitates estimation of dynamic games with either small or large number of players whose heterogeneity is determined by latent state variables, discrete or continuous, that are subject to endogenous feedback from past actions.

Keywords: Dynamic Games, Partially Observed State, Endogenous State, Serially Correlated State, Particle Filter.

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1 Introduction

In many economic applications a researcher is interested in estimating a dynamic model where some of the agent specific states may be subject to feedback from past actions (e.g., Rust (1987)), partially observed and heterogeneous (e.g., Keane and Wolpin (1997)) or serially correlated (e.g., Miller (1984), Pakes (1986)).¹ In this paper we propose a Bayesian approach to estimating dynamic models with a partially observed state that has a Markovian representation of the dynamics and an algorithm to solve the model including those with serially correlated, endogenous, heterogeneous, state variables. The method uses sequential importance sampling (particle filter) to compute an unbiased estimate of the likelihood within a Metropolis MCMC chain. Here, unbiasedness means that expectation is with respect to the uniform draws that are used to compute the particle filter with all else held fixed. Unbiasedness guarantees that the stationary density of the chain is the exact posterior, not an approximation. The regularity conditions are weak and should be satisfied by most stationary, parametric models of interest.

Our approach contributes to the literature in several ways. We derive the unbiasedness of the estimator of the likelihood that leads to an exact posterior. This allows for tractable computation and feasible estimation of a dynamic model. In addition the latent state variables can be either discrete or continuous. Moreover, it permits endogenous feedback of past actions on the latent state variables that leads to heterogeneity among the players. We illustrate our method with two examples. The first example in Section 6.1 is based on a dynamic model of entry developed in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017). This is a dynamic discrete game in which a firm's cost of production is a continuous state variable that is serially persistent, unobserved (to the researcher), and endogenous to past actions. The endogenous feedback arises because past entry in markets for other products creates a capacity constraint that affects the costs of entering a market in the current period. This endogenous evolution of costs induces heterogeneity among firms over time in the model. Our second example, in Section 6.2, is an Ericson and Pakes (1995) style model from Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2010) with a large number of firms whose heterogeneity is based on the

¹For more elaborate discussion on the motivations and rationale for estimating such dynamic models see e.g., Rust (1994), Keane (2010), Wolpin (2013).

quality of their products. The firms compete by investing in product quality that in turn affects their market share, revenues and profits.

Empirical models of static and dynamic games are differentiated by their information structures. A unified approach for dynamic models of incomplete information has been developed by Hu and Shum (2012). Blevins (2016) also uses sequential importance sampling for estimating games of incomplete information, while Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang (2017) allow for two-step estimation of such games with endogenous feedback. In our paper we focus on dynamic, complete information games because of the paucity of literature on estimation of such games. These games typically require the use of a combinatorial algorithm to search for an equilibrium instead of the continuous fixed point mapping used in incomplete information models. Unlike games of incomplete information, the complete information assumption requires that no player has any private information. However, it allows substantial unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firms because the researcher does not observe all the information that the players have. In contrast, games of incomplete information require there to be no difference between what is observed by the players and the researcher. While static games of complete information have been estimated by, e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), to our knowledge, we are the first to study dynamic games of complete information.

We prove the unbiasedness of an estimator of a likelihood obtained via particle filtering under regularity conditions that allow for endogenous feedback from the observed measurements to the dynamic state variables. Endogenous feedback is the feature that distinguishes this paper from the bulk of the particle filter literature. We establish our results by means of a recursive setup and an inductive argument that avoids the complexity of ancestor tracing during the resampling steps. This process allows elegant, compact proofs.

The rest of paper is organized as follows. We discuss related literature in Section 2. Section 3 describes the games to which our results apply. An algorithm for unbiased estimation of a likelihood is proposed and unbiasedness is proved in Section 4. The MCMC estimation algorithm is presented in Section 5. Two examples are described in Section 6: the first has a small number of players, the second a large number of players. Simulation results for the two examples are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Literature

There is a growing literature on the estimation of games. Some of this literature focuses on games of incomplete information, either static (e.g., Haile, Hortaçsu, and Kosenok (2008), Ho (2009)) or dynamic (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007)). The literature on estimating games of incomplete information is largely based on the two-step conditional choice probability estimator of Hotz and Miller (1993).² Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) have extended the literature on two step estimation of dynamic models of discrete choice to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in discrete types of latent states using the EM algorithm. Bayesian approaches that use MCMC for integrating out the unobserved state variables that are serially correlated over time have been developed by Imai, Jain, and Ching (2009) and Norets (2009). These papers focus on single agent dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved state variables. In contrast, we use sequential importance sampling to integrate out the unobserved state variables. Additionally, we are the first to apply this method to multi-agent dynamic games with strategic interaction, which are more computationally complex than single agent dynamic models.

The purely methodological papers most closely related to the econometric approach used here are Keane (1994), and more recently, Flury and Shephard (2010) and Pitt, Silva, Giordani, and Kohn (2012).³ Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) used sequential importance sampling to estimate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Most of this literature, however, abstracts from the strategic interaction between agents. Akerberg (2009) has developed a method for using importance sampling coupled with a change of variables technique to provide computational gains in estimating certain game theoretic and dynamic discrete choice models that admit a random coefficient representation.

²The two step estimation strategy makes the restrictive assumption that there is no market or firm level unobserved heterogeneity other than an IID random shock across both time and players. This assumption rules out any dynamics in the latent state variables. Moreover, it precludes any private information that an agent might possess about its rivals that is unavailable to the researcher.

³See Doucet, De Freitas, Gordon, et al. (2001) and Liu (2008) for an overview and examples of other applications.

3 The Game

A prominent example of a model to which our results apply is a dynamic game of complete information which we describe next. The game consists of I players, $i = 1, \dots, I$, who can choose action a_{it} at each time period t . Let $a_t = (a_{1t}, a_{2t}, \dots, a_{It})$. In an entry game as in our first Monte Carlo example below in Section 6.1, $a_{it} = 1$ if firm i enters at time t , if not, $a_{it} = 0$. Another example of a_{it} could be the level of investment which affects the quality of a firm's product as in an Ericson and Pakes (1995) style model, that is found in our second Monte Carlo example below in Section 6.2. Time runs in discrete increments from $t = 0, \dots, \infty$. The state vector is $x_t = (x_{1t}, x_{2t})$, where in turn $x_{1t} = (x_{1t,i}, x_{1t,-i})$ and $x_{2t} = (x_{2t,i}, x_{2t,-i})$. The actions of all players a_t and the state vector $x_t = (x_{1t}, x_{2t})$ is observable by all players. We (the researchers) only observe the actions of all players a_t and the state x_{2t} but not x_{1t} . The $x_{1t} = (x_{1t,i}, x_{1t,-i})$ is an agent specific latent (to the researcher) state that is allowed to be serially correlated. In our first Monte Carlo example below in Section 6.1, this is considered to be the latent firm specific cost of production. In the our second Monte Carlo example below in Section 6.2, this is the firm's product quality. The $x_{2t} = (x_{2t,i}, x_{2t,-i})$ is any observable market level or firm specific observable state, such as a market level demand or cost shifter or firm characteristic such as past market entry experience. The game is indexed by a parameter vector θ that is known to the players and which we seek to estimate.

To formalize the model further, we define the reduced form one-shot payoff function (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992)) as,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pi_i(a_{it}, a_{-it}, x_{1t,i}, x_{1t,-i}, x_{2t,i}, x_{2t,-i}, \theta) \\ & = R(a_{it}, a_{-it}, x_{1t,i}^R, x_{1t,-i}^R, x_{2t,i}^R, x_{2t,-i}^R, \theta^R) - C(a_{it}, a_{-it}, x_{1t,i}^C, x_{1t,-i}^C, x_{2t,i}^C, x_{2t,-i}^C, \theta^C), \quad (1) \end{aligned}$$

where $R(\cdot)$ is a revenue function, and $C(\cdot)$ is a cost function. The state variables can affect either the revenue or cost functions, and are denoted as $x_{qt,j}^R$ and $x_{qt,j}^C$ respectively as appropriate, for $q = 1, 2$ and $j = i, -i$. Moreover, the latent firm specific stochastic state, $x_{1t,i}$ can in principle affect either the revenue or cost function or both. In our first Monte Carlo example it is modeled as firm specific cost of production. However, in the our second Monte Carlo example it affects the revenue function. The θ^R and θ^C are vectors of model

parameters associated with the revenue and cost functions respectively. It should be noted that the "structural error" or the primary source of randomness from the point of view of the researcher is provided by x_{1t} .

The dynamics in the model arise because given the state x_t , the players choose actions a_t according to the probability density function $p(a_t|x_t, \theta)$. Furthermore, the transition density $p(x_t|a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta)$ governs the evolution of the state vector. This transition density allows for serial persistence and endogenous feedback from the past actions a_{t-1} on the latent states x_{1t} .

Given an initial state x_t at time t , the firm's expected present discounted profit is

$$\mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau-t} \Pi_i(a_{i\tau}, a_{-i\tau}, x_\tau) \middle| x_t \right], \quad (2)$$

where β is the discount factor, $0 \leq \beta < 1$. Each firm i seeks to maximize the present discounted value of its stream of profits at each time period t conditional on its rivals' action profiles being best response equilibrium strategies. The expectation operator here \mathcal{E} is with respect to the future evolution of state variables and actions of all firms.

In specifying a dynamic game of complete information we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in pure strategies. In doing this we build on the literature on estimating static games of complete information (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)) and dynamic games of incomplete information (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007)). We use the following notation in order to define the MPE strategies for the game. As stated above x_t is the payoff-relevant state for each firm i at time t . Let \mathcal{X} represent the state space containing all feasible values of x_t for each firm i . Similarly, let \mathcal{A}_i represent firm i 's choice set (i.e., $a_{it} \in \mathcal{A}_i$). Then we define a Markov strategy for firm i as a function $\sigma_i : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_i$ mapping payoff-relevant state variables to the set of all possible actions. Furthermore, $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_I)$ denotes a profile of Markov strategies for all firms.

Dropping the time indices, and denoting the Markov Perfect Equilibrium strategy profile (to be defined below in the next paragraph) $(\tilde{\sigma}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_{-i})$, when the realized actions and strategies in the current period are, $a_i = \sigma_i(x)$ and $a_{-i} = \sigma_{-i}(x)$, the choice specific value function is given by,

$$V_i(x; \sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}) = \Pi_i(\sigma_i(x), \sigma_{-i}(x), x_i) + \beta \mathcal{E} [V_i(x'; \tilde{\sigma}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_{-i}) \mid x, a_i = \sigma_i(x), a_{-i} = \sigma_{-i}(x)] \quad (3)$$

In the above equation, the first component is the current payoff, Π_i . The first argument of the payoff function Π_i is $a_i = \sigma_i(x)$, which is the implied action by firm i under strategy σ_i when the state is x . Similarly, the second argument is $a_{-i} = \sigma_{-i}(x)$, which is a profile of rival actions given the state x . The second component in the above equation is the present discounted value of the stream of profits conditional on the current actions of all firms and the current state, when the firms play MPE strategies in the future. The expectation is with respect to the future states and actions of all players.

The Markov Perfect Equilibrium strategy profile $\tilde{\sigma}$ is defined such that no firm i unilaterally deviates from its strategy $\tilde{\sigma}_i$ when $\tilde{\sigma}_{-i}$ is the strategy profile adopted by its rivals. Hence, there is no alternative Markov strategy σ_i for any firm i that provides a higher level of present discounted value of expected profits (in terms of $V_i(\cdot)$) than $\tilde{\sigma}_i$ when the firm's rivals are using their equilibrium strategies $\tilde{\sigma}_{-i}$. Stated more formally, a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) strategy profile $\tilde{\sigma}$ is one such that for all firms i , all states x , and for all alternative Markov strategies σ_i the following condition holds:

$$V_i(x; \tilde{\sigma}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_{-i}) \geq V_i(x; \sigma_i, \tilde{\sigma}_{-i}). \quad (4)$$

From Equation (4), it should be noted that $V_i(x) \equiv V_i(x; \tilde{\sigma}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_{-i})$ is defined in the literature to be the ex-ante value function. It gives the expected present discounted value of profits obtained by firm i when players use MPE strategies $\tilde{\sigma}$ and the state is x . Implicit in what follows is an assumption that the game is stationary, an algorithm to solve the game is available and that an equilibrium to the game exists.

One limitation of relying on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium solution concept is that it is computationally intractable when a game consists of a large number of players. Thus, we show below in Section 6.2 that our approach can also apply in the context of the Oblivious Equilibrium solution concept developed by Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008) to deal specifically with games with a large number of players. In particular we do this because Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008) show that this approach can be quite accurate in approximating the MPE solution for games with a large number of players.

4 Evaluating the Likelihood

In this section we derive an unbiased particle filter estimate of the likelihood for a Markov process with partially observed state and endogenous feedback that is general enough to accommodate the game described in Subsection 3. Because of endogenous feedback, no previous proof of unbiasedness, e.g., Pitt, Silva, Giordani, and Kohn (2012), applies to our knowledge. In fact, we think that the remarkable simplicity of our proofs makes them of interest regardless. In Theorem 1 we establish a recursion using Bayes theorem. The idea is straightforward and is expressed as one four line equation. The remainder of the proof is algebra to reduce the basic expression to model primitives. In Corollary 1 we establish unbiasedness via a simple two line telescoping expression. In Theorem 2 we show that resampling is a mere footnote requiring only three sentences to dismiss.

Because we only require unbiasedness, our regularity conditions are quite weak – much weaker than is standard in the particle filter literature.⁴ While the result does not require that the number of particles tend to infinity, the number of particles does affect the rejection rate of the MCMC chain so that the number of particles, like the scale of the proposal density, becomes a tuning parameter of the chain that has to be adjusted. Below in Section 5 we use MCMC to compute the posterior. If one has an unbiased estimator of the likelihood the posterior is the stationary distribution of the MCMC chain.⁵

What distinguishes our approach from, e.g., simulation methods, which would be applicable, is that an inference is exact within the Bayesian paradigm.⁶ All other approaches known to us only approximate the likelihood to within an accuracy that is often not known. Therefore, inferences using other methods are approximate, not exact.

The last sentence of the preceding paragraph has to be taken with a grain of salt. To quote a referee:

This is somewhat “snarky”; non-Bayesians are probably just as happy with their

⁴See, e.g. Andrieu, Douced, and Holenstein (2010) and the references therein.

⁵See e.g., Flury and Shephard (2010) and Pitt, Silva, Giordani, and Kohn (2012).

⁶A recent exception is the simulation estimator proposed by Gallant and Tauchen (2017). It is exact as to theory but does require that the distributional assumption regarding a semi-pivotal that implies exactness be verified by simulation in practice. Depending on one’s attitude toward verification by simulation, one may or may not regard the method as exact.

asymptotic or approximate inference as Bayesians are with their “exact” inference (and mutually suspicious of each others approaches!)

In the case one has a conditional density of the form $f(y|x, \theta)$ and a marginal $f(x|\theta)$, where y, x , are vectors of the same length with y observed and x not, the property of a particle filter that is usually of interest is its ability to generate a sample from the density $f(x|y, \theta)$ for given θ . In the abstract, a particle filter algorithm can be viewed as a transformation of a vector u of independent uniform draws to a set of draws $\{x^{(k)}\}_{k=1}^N$ from $f(x|y, \theta)$. We are not concerned with that property of the algorithm here. Rather, we are concerned with a side effect of the algorithm which is that at an intermediate stage of the computations it generates an estimate $\hat{\ell}(u)$ of $\ell = \int f(y|x, \theta)f(x|\theta) dx$ that is unbiased in the sense that $\int \hat{\ell}(u)f(u) du = \ell$, where $f(u)$ is the density of u . In Subsection 4.2 we provide a bare bones description of a particle filter that is adequate to allow one to follow the theoretical discussion. The theoretical discussion is followed by a detailed description of the algorithm that we propose in Subsection 4.6.

4.1 Requirements

The essentials of the game of Section 3 relative to the requirements of filtering are as follows.

The state vector is

$$x_t = (x_{1t}, x_{2t}), \tag{5}$$

where x_{1t} is not observed and x_{2t} is observed. The observation (or measurement) density is

$$p(a_t | x_t, \theta). \tag{6}$$

The transition density is denoted by

$$p(x_t | a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta). \tag{7}$$

The marginal for x_{1t} is

$$p(x_{1t} | a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta). \tag{8}$$

The marginal stationary density is denoted by

$$p(x_{1t} | \theta). \tag{9}$$

ASSUMPTION 1 We assume that we can draw from (8) and (9). As to the latter, one way to draw a sample of size N from (9) is to simulate the game and set $x_1^{(k)} = x_{1,\tau+M*k}$ for $k = 1, \dots, N$ for some τ past the point where transients have died off and some M . Large M has the advantage that the $x_1^{(k)}$ are nearly serially uncorrelated. We can draw from (8) by drawing from (7) and discarding x_{2t} . We assume that there is either an analytic expression or algorithm to compute (6) and (7). We assume the same for (8) but if this is difficult some other importance sampler can be substituted as discussed in Subsection 4.5.

The full information likelihood is

$$\ell = p(a_0, x_{2,0}) \prod_{t=1}^T p(a_t, x_{2,t} | a_{t-1}, x_{2,t-1}, \dots, a_0, x_{2,0}, \theta) = p(a_0, x_{2,0}) \prod_{t=1}^T C_t. \quad (10)$$

We are unwilling to impose the additional structure on the game necessary to be able to estimate $p(a_0, x_{2,0})$ unbiasedly. Therefore, as is routinely done in time series analysis, we discard the information in the stationary density for $(a_0, x_{2,0})$. With this convention, the object of interest is the partial information likelihood

$$\ell' = \prod_{t=1}^T C_t. \quad (11)$$

In the event that one can evaluate the density $p(a_t, x_{2t} | x_{1,t}, \theta)$ or has some other means to estimate $p(a_0, x_{2,0})$ unbiasedly, the modifications to what we propose are trivial and are discussed later.

4.2 A Particle Filter

A particle for the latent variable $x_{1,t}$ is a sequence of the form

$$x_{1,0:t}^{(k)} = \left(x_{1,0}^{(k)}, x_{1,1}^{(k)}, \dots, x_{1,t}^{(k)} \right),$$

where $k = 1, 2, \dots, N$ indexes the particles. They are i.i.d. draws from the conditional density

$$p(x_{1,0:t} | a_{1,0:t-1}, x_{2,0:t-1}, \theta).$$

An algorithm using particles to estimate the partial information likelihood ℓ' unbiasedly is as follows:

- Initialize by putting $\hat{C}_0 = 1$ and letting $\left\{x_{1,0:t}^{(k)}\right\}_{k=1}^N$ be draws $x_{1,0}^{(k)}$ from the marginal stationary density (9).

If one has particles $\left\{x_{1,0:t-1}^{(k)}\right\}_{k=1}^N$ in hand, one advances as follows:

- Draw $\tilde{x}_{1t}^{(k)}$ from the transition density

$$p(x_{1t} | a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta).$$

- Compute

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{v}_t^{(k)} &= \frac{p\left(a_t | \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta\right) p\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t} | a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta\right)}{p\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)} | a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta\right)} \\ \hat{C}_t &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_t^{(k)} \\ \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)} &= \left(x_{1,0:t-1}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}\right) \\ \hat{w}_t^{(k)} &= \frac{\bar{v}_t^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_t^{(k)}} \end{aligned}$$

- Draw $\left\{x_{1,0:t}^{(k)}\right\}_{k=1}^N$ i.i.d. from the discrete distribution $P\left(x_{1,0:t} = \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}\right) = \hat{w}_t^{(k)}$.

Repeat until $t = T$.

- An unbiased estimate of the partial information likelihood is $\hat{\ell}' = \prod_{t=0}^T \hat{C}_t$.

We next verify the algorithm.

4.3 Verification

In the Bayesian paradigm, the parameter vector θ is manipulated as if it were distributed jointly with the data even though one might actually regard θ as fixed. Thus, formally, we may let $\left\{\{a_t, x_t\}_{t=-T_0}^\infty, \theta\right\}$ be defined on a common probability space \mathcal{P} over the support of a_t, x_t , and θ . Let $\mathcal{F}_t = \sigma\left\{\{a_s, x_{2s}\}_{s=-T_0}^t, \theta\right\}$. Let $P(\cdot | \mathcal{F}_t)$ denote the conditional probability measure given \mathcal{F}_t over \mathcal{P} . Let $\mathcal{E}(\cdot | \mathcal{F}_t)$ denote conditional expectation given \mathcal{F}_t .

The elements of a_t and x_t may have either atomless or discrete distributions. No generality is lost by presuming that the discrete elements are positive integers. Let z denote a generic

vector some of whose coordinates are real numbers and the others positive integers. Let $\lambda(z)$ denote a product measure whose marginals are either counting measure on the positive integers or Lebesgue ordered as is appropriate to define an integral of the form $\int g(z) d\lambda(z)$. The densities defined in Subsection 4.1 are with respect to a measure of the form $\lambda(z)$. We will often write, e.g., $\int g(x_t) dP(x_t|a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta)$ to mean integration of $g(x_t)p(x_t|a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta)$ with respect to the product measure $\lambda(x_t)$.

Particle filters are advanced by drawing independent uniform random variables $u_{t+1}^{(1)}, \dots, u_{t+1}^{(N)}$ and then evaluating a function of the form $X_{1,t+1}^{(k)}(u_{t+1}^{(k)}, a_{0:t}, \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, x_{2,0:t})$ and putting $\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)} = X_{1,t+1}^{(k)}(u_{t+1}^{(k)}, a_{0:t}, \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, x_{2,0:t})$ for $k = 1, \dots, N$. Denote expectation with respect to $u_{t+1}^{(1)}, \dots, u_{t+1}^{(N)}$ by $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,t+1}$. Due to the recursive nature of a particle filter, $\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}$ will itself depend on uniform draws. Denote expectation with respect to the uniform draws involved in $\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}$ by $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t}$. For now we are excluding resampling. In Subsection 4.4 we show that the extension of the results of this subsection to the case where resampling is employed amounts to simply increasing the scope of $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t}$ to include not only the uniform draws that advance the filter but also the uniform draws involved in resampling.

Under these conventions, note that what is random in an expression such as $\mathcal{E} \left[g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}) | \mathcal{F}_t \right]$ are the uniform draws involved in $\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}$. All else is fixed due to conditioning on \mathcal{F}_t .

In this subsection we show that estimate of the likelihood given in Subsection 4.2 is unbiased for either the full information likelihood or a partial information likelihood, depending on how initial conditions are handled.

THEOREM 1 Under Assumption 1, if the particles $\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}$ and weights $\tilde{w}_t^{(k)}$, $k = 1, \dots, N$, satisfy

$$\int g(x_{1,0:t}) dP(x_{1,0:t} | \mathcal{F}_t) = \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t} \left\{ \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_t^{(k)} g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}) | \mathcal{F}_t \right] \right\} \quad (12)$$

for every integrable function $g(x_{1,0:t})$, then draws $\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}$ from $p(x_{1,t+1} | \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \mathcal{F}_t)$ and weights

$$\tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} = \frac{\bar{v}_{t+1}^{(k)}}{C_{t+1}} \tilde{w}_t^{(k)} \quad (13)$$

satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} & \int g(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}) dP(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_{t+1}) \\ &= \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,t+1} \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t} \left\{ \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}) | \mathcal{F}_{t+1} \right] \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

where

$$\bar{v}_{t+1}^{(k)} = \frac{p(a_{t+1} | \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t+1}, \theta) p(\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t+1} | a_t, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta)}{p(\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)} | a_t, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta)} \quad (15)$$

and

$$C_{t+1} = p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t). \quad (16)$$

Proof We first show the result for the weights

$$\tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} = \frac{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, \mathcal{F}_t)}{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t)} \tilde{w}_t^{(k)}, \quad (17)$$

which we write as $w_{t+1}^{(k)}$ below when evaluated at $x_{1,t+1}$ instead of $\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}$, and then show that (17) and (13) are equivalent expressions for $\tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)}$.

Bayes theorem states that

$$p(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t) = \frac{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1}, x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t)}{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t)}. \quad (18)$$

Note that

$$p(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t) = p(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_{t+1}) \quad (19)$$

and that

$$\begin{aligned} & p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1}, x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t) \\ &= p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t) p(x_{1,t+1} | x_{1,0:t}, \mathcal{F}_t) p(x_{1,0:t} | \mathcal{F}_t). \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} & \int g(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}) dP(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_{t+1}) \\ &= \iint g(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}) \frac{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t)}{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t)} p(x_{1,t+1} | x_{1,0:t}, \mathcal{F}_t) \end{aligned}$$

$$\times d\lambda(x_{1,t+1})dP(x_{1,0:t}|\mathcal{F}_t) \quad (21)$$

$$= \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t} \int \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, x_{1,t+1}) w_{t+1}^{(k)} p(x_{1,t+1}|\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \mathcal{F}_t) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] d\lambda(x_{1,t+1}) \quad (22)$$

$$= \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,t+1} \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t} \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}) \tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} \mid \mathcal{F}_{t+1} \right] \quad (23)$$

where (21) is due to (18) after substituting (19) and (20), (22) is due to (12) and (17), and (23) is due to the fact that $\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}$ is a draw from $p(x_{1,t+1}|\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \mathcal{F}_t)$. This proves the result for the weights (17).

We show that (17) and (13) are equivalent, by reexpressing the numerator of (17) in terms of the primitives (6), (7), and (8) as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} & p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t) \\ &= p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} | x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}, x_{2,0:t}, a_{0:t}, \theta) \\ &= \frac{p(a_{t+1}, x_{t+1}, a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta)}{\int p(a_{t+1}, x_{t+1}, a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta) d\lambda(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1})} \\ &= \frac{p(a_{t+1} | x_{t+1}, a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta) p(x_{t+1} | a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta) p(a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta)}{\int p(a_{t+1} | x_{t+1}, a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta) p(x_{t+1} | a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta) d\lambda(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1}) p(a_{0:t}, x_{0:t}, \theta)} \\ &= \frac{p(a_{t+1} | x_{t+1}, \theta) p(x_{t+1} | a_t, x_t, \theta)}{\int p(a_{t+1} | x_{t+1}, \theta) p(x_{t+1} | a_t, x_t, \theta) d\lambda(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1})} \\ &= \frac{p(a_{t+1} | x_{t+1}, \theta) p(x_{t+1} | a_t, x_t, \theta)}{\int p(x_{t+1} | a_t, x_t, \theta) d\lambda(x_{2,t+1})} \\ &= \frac{p(a_{t+1} | x_{t+1}, \theta) p(x_{t+1} | a_t, x_t, \theta)}{p(x_{1,t+1} | a_t, x_t, \theta)} \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

□

REMARK 1 An implication of (14) is that N affects the second moment of

$$\mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}) \mid \mathcal{F}_{t+1} \right]$$

but not the first moment. □

REMARK 2 We may assume without loss of generality that all N of the weights $\tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)}$ given by (13) are positive because one can, e.g., discard all particles with zero weight then,

as often as necessary to get N particles, replicate the particle with the largest weight and divide that weight evenly between that particle and its replicates. \square

COROLLARY 1 Under Assumption 1, if one starts the recursion of Theorem 1 with draws from the marginal stationary density (9) and weights $\tilde{w}_0^{(k)} = 1/N$, then

$$\hat{\ell}' = \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_T^{(k)} \frac{\tilde{w}_{T-1}^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_{T-1}^{(k)}} \right) \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_{T-1}^{(k)} \frac{\tilde{w}_{T-2}^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_{T-2}^{(k)}} \right) \cdots \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_1^{(k)} \frac{\tilde{w}_0^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_0^{(k)}} \right) \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_0^{(k)} \right) \quad (25)$$

is an unbiased estimator of ℓ' .

Proof Set $g(x_{1,0:t}, u) \equiv 1$ in Theorem 1 whence $1 = \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:T} \left\{ \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_t^{(k)} \mid \mathcal{F}_T \right] \right\}$. Write

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_T^{(k)} &= \frac{1}{C_T} \left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_T^{(k)} \tilde{w}_{T-1}^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_{T-1}^{(k)} \tilde{w}_{T-2}^{(k)}} \right) \left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_{T-1}^{(k)} \tilde{w}_{T-2}^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_{T-2}^{(k)} \tilde{w}_{T-3}^{(k)}} \right) \cdots \left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_1^{(k)} \tilde{w}_0^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_0^{(k)}} \right) \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_0^{(k)} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{\hat{\ell}'} \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_T^{(k)} \frac{\tilde{w}_{T-1}^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_{T-1}^{(k)}} \right) \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_{T-1}^{(k)} \frac{\tilde{w}_{T-2}^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_{T-2}^{(k)}} \right) \cdots \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_1^{(k)} \frac{\tilde{w}_0^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_0^{(k)}} \right) \left(\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_0^{(k)} \right) \end{aligned}$$

The result follows. \square

REMARK 3 Note that the terms $\frac{\tilde{w}_t^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_t^{(k)}}$ in (25) are invariant to C_t so that $\hat{\ell}'$ can be computed without knowledge of the C_t . Thus, one can arbitrarily set $C_t \equiv 1$ in (13) for weights that are to be used in (25) as is done in the algorithms of Subsections 4.2 and 4.6. \square

REMARK 4 If one has an expression for $p(a_0, x_{2,0} \mid x_{1,0}, \theta)$, then

$$\hat{\ell} = \hat{\ell}' \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N p(a_0, x_{2,0} \mid \tilde{x}_{1,0}^{(k)}, \theta)$$

is an unbiased estimator of ℓ . \square

4.4 Resampling

One often resamples particles such as $\left\{ \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)} \right\}_{k=1}^N$ in order to prevent the variance of the weights $\tilde{w}_t^{(k)}$ from increasing with t . Most common is multinomial resampling where one samples $\left\{ \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)} \right\}_{k=1}^N$ with replacement with probability $\frac{\tilde{w}_t^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_t^{(k)}}$. Some particles will get copied and some particles will not survive. The new particles $\left\{ x_{1,0:t}^{(k)} \right\}_{k=1}^N$ each have weight $\frac{1}{N}$.

Multinomial resampling is usually performed by drawing uniform random numbers $\{u_i\}_{i=1}^N$ on the interval $(0, 1)$ and evaluating the quantile function $q(u)$ of the discrete density $p(k) = \frac{\tilde{w}_i^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{w}_i^{(k)}}$ at the u_i to get the resampled particles $x_{1,0:t}^{(i)} = \tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(q(u_i))}$. Other resampling schemes seek to improve performance by having one uniform random number in each interval $[(i-1)/N, i/N]$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$. One approach is stratified resampling where one uniform u is drawn inside each interval. Another is systematic resampling where the same uniform u is placed inside each interval. As with multinomial resampling, the weights for stratified and systematic sampling are $\frac{1}{N}$. In a comparison of stratified and systematic resampling, Douc, Cappé, and Moulines (2005) find that their performance is similar.

THEOREM 2 Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 remain valid if resampling is applied between recursive steps as in the algorithm of Subsection 4.2.

Proof By construction, if a set of particles and weights satisfy condition (12) then so will the particles and weights generated from them by resampling. Because a set of particles and weights satisfy condition (12) at the end of an iterate, the set of particles and weights generated from them by resampling will satisfy (12) when used at the beginning of an iterate. The only formal change to the development of Subsection 4.3 required is that $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t}$ becomes expectation both with respect to the uniform draws that advance the filter and to the uniform draws involved in resampling. \square

REMARK 5 For any resampling scheme that produces equal weights, the conclusion of Corollary 1 becomes

$$\hat{\ell}' = \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_T^{(k)} \right) \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_{T-1}^{(k)} \right) \cdots \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_1^{(k)} \right)$$

is an unbiased estimator of ℓ' . \square

4.5 An Alternative Importance Sampler

If computing $p(x_{1,t+1}|a_t, x_t, \theta)$ is costly or drawing from it troublesome, one can substitute an alternative importance sampler. The idea is that one can advance a filter from $(\tilde{x}_t^{(k)}, \tilde{w}_t^{(k)})$ that satisfies (12) to $(\tilde{x}_{t+1}^{(k)}, \tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)})$ that satisfies (14) by drawing $\tilde{x}_{t+1}^{(k)}$ from

$$f(x_{1,t+1}|x_{1t}, \mathcal{F}_t) = f(x_{1,t+1} | a_t, \tilde{x}_{1t}^{(k)}, x_{2t}, \theta) \quad (26)$$

for $k = 1, \dots, N$, and setting

$$\tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} = \frac{p\left(a_{t+1} \mid \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t+1}, \theta\right) p\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t+1} \mid a_t, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta\right)}{C_{t+1} f\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)} \mid a_t, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta\right)} \tilde{w}_t^{(k)} \quad (27)$$

as is seen by noting that (21), (22), and (23) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} & \iint g(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}) \frac{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} \mid x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t)}{p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} \mid \mathcal{F}_t)} \frac{p(x_{1,t+1} \mid x_{1,0:t}, \mathcal{F}_t)}{f(x_{1,t+1} \mid x_{1,t}, \mathcal{F}_t)} f(x_{1,t+1} \mid x_{1,t}, \mathcal{F}_t) \\ & \quad \times d\lambda(x_{t+1}) dP(x_{1,0:t} \mid \mathcal{F}_t) \\ & = \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t} \int \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, x_{1,t+1}) \tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} f(x_{1,t+1} \mid \tilde{x}_t^{(k)}, \mathcal{F}_t) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] d\lambda(x_{1,t+1}) \\ & = \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,t+1} \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{1,0:t} \mathcal{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^N g(\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{t+1}^{(k)}) \tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} \mid \mathcal{F}_{t+1} \right] \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

due to the cancellation $p(x_{1,t+1} \mid x_{1,0:t}, \mathcal{F}_t) / p(x_{1,t+1} \mid a_t, x_t, \theta) = 1$ that occurs after the expression for $p(a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1} \mid x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}, \mathcal{F}_t)$ given by (24) is substituted in (28).

The equations that replace (13) and (15) when an alternative importance sampler is used are

$$\tilde{w}_{t+1}^{(k)} = \frac{\bar{v}_{t+1}^{(k)}}{C_{t+1}} \tilde{w}_t^{(k)} \quad (13')$$

and

$$\bar{v}_{t+1}^{(k)} = \frac{p\left(a_{t+1} \mid \tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t+1}, \theta\right) p\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t+1} \mid a_t, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta\right)}{f\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t+1}^{(k)} \mid a_t, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta\right)}. \quad (15')$$

The requisite regularity condition is the following:

ASSUMPTION 2

$$g(x_{1,0:t}, x_{1,t+1}) \frac{p(a_{t+1} \mid x_{1,t+1}, x_{2,t+1}, \theta) p(x_{1,t+1}, x_{2,t+1} \mid a_t, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, \theta)}{f(x_{1,t+1} \mid a_t, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, \theta)}$$

is integrable with respect to $f(x_{1,t+1} \mid a_t, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, \theta)$, the support of which contains the support of $p(x_{1,t+1} \mid a_t, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, \theta)$.

Another reason to consider an alternative importance sampler is to improve efficiency. Pitt and Shephard (1999) suggest some adaptive importance samplers that one might consider. In addition to Pitt and Shephard's (1999) suggestions, one can use the notion

of reprojection (Gallant and Tauchen (1998)) to construct an adaptive density for (26) as follows. The model can be simulated. Therefore, for given θ^* a large simulation of $(a_t, x_{1t}, x_{2t}, a_{t+1}, x_{1,t+1}, x_{2,t+1})$ can be generated. Using multivariate regression one can determine the location $\mu(v)$ of $x_{1,t+1}$ as a linear function of

$$v = (a_t, x_{1t}, x_{2t}, a_{t+1}, x_{2,t+1}) \quad (29)$$

and the conditional variance Σ . The simulation can be taken so large that $\mu(v)$ and Σ can be regarded as population quantities. We put

$$h(x_{1,t+1}|x_{1t}, \mathcal{F}_{t+1}) = n(x_{1,t+1}|\mu(v), \Sigma), \quad (30)$$

where $n(\cdot|\mu, \Sigma)$ denotes the multivariate normal density and use (30) in place of (26), which is a slight abuse of notation because the argument lists are different. Substituting the multivariate Student- t density on five degrees of freedom with the same location and scale had little effect on results other than increase run times.

The mean or the mode of an informative prior is a reasonable choice of θ^* for the simulation that determines $\mu(v)$ and Σ . If the prior is flat, one can start with a guess, run a preliminary chain, and use the mean of the preliminary chain for θ^* .

4.6 Computing the Likelihood

In this subsection we refine the algorithm of Subsection 4.2 to incorporate the developments of the foregoing subsections and to discuss how seeds must be handled in order for the MCMC chain that uses an unbiased estimate of the likelihood to target the intended posterior. Handling the seed correctly is of critical importance; on this see Flury and Shephard (2010) and Pitt, Silva, Giordani, and Kohn (2012).

Actually, the reasoning is straightforward: The seed s is a random variable distributed over a finite set of integers \mathcal{S} ; its density is $u(s)$. Let $\mathcal{L}(\theta)$ be the likelihood of a game and $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s)$ its unbiased approximation in the sense that $\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \mathcal{L}(\theta, s)u(s)$. If one draws (θ, s) from the joint density $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s)u(s)p(\theta)$, where $p(\theta)$ is the prior, and discards s then θ that remains is a draw from the marginal $\mathcal{L}(\theta)p(\theta)$. The crucial observation is that the ratio

$$\frac{\mathcal{L}(\theta^*, s^*)u(s^*)p(\theta^*)\lambda(\theta^*, \theta^\#)u(s^\#)}{\mathcal{L}(\theta^\#, s^\#)u(s^\#)p(\theta^\#)\lambda(\theta^\#, \theta^*)u(s^*)}$$

that determines acceptance in an MCMC algorithm becomes

$$\frac{\mathcal{L}(\theta^*, s^*)p(\theta^*)\lambda(\theta^*, \theta^\#)}{\mathcal{L}(\theta^\#, s^\#)p(\theta^\#)\lambda(\theta^\#, \theta^*)}$$

as in the algorithm described in Section 5, where $(\theta^\#, s^\#)$ is the end of the chain, (θ^*, s^*) is the proposed extension of the chain, and $\lambda(\theta^\#, \theta^*)u(s^*)$ is the proposal density. One can see that if $s^\#$ and s^* were not independent draws from $u(s)$ then the MCMC algorithm would not target $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s)u(s)p(\theta)$. One would not have to devote such attention to the seed were it not that one is usually advised to use the same seed every time to compute $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s)$ in order to reduce Monte Carlo jitter. Here the advice is exactly the opposite.

Random number algorithms have different designs varying from those that generate an array of random numbers intended to supply all that are ever needed with one call, through intermediate designs, to a simple functional recursion that may be conceptualized as follows:

A draw from a density $f(v)$ is obtained by drawing a seed s from a uniform density $u(s)$ defined over a finite set of integers and executing an algorithm that evaluates a function $V(s)$ and returns $v' = V(s)$ and s' such that v' has density $f(v)$, s' has density $u(s)$, and s' is independent of s . The next draw from the same or a different density uses s' to return a draw v'' from that density and another new seed s'' , and so on.

We may, without loss of generality, assume that whatever algorithm is used, a wrapper has been coded so that becomes a simple functional recursion.

The algorithm that we describe next may have a sequence of draws within it but viewed as a whole it is a functional recursion: One specifies θ and provides a random draw s from $u(s)$. The algorithm evaluates a function $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s)$ and returns $\hat{\ell}' = \mathcal{L}(\theta, s)$ and a draw s' from $u(s)$ that is independent of s .

Given seed s and parameter θ , the algorithm for evaluating $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s)$ follows. All draws use the seed returned by the previous draw; there are no fixed seeds anywhere within the algorithm.

1. For $t = 0$

(a) Start N particles by drawing $\tilde{x}_{1,0}^{(k)}$ from $p(x_{1,0} | \theta)$ using s as the initial seed.

(b) If $p(a_t, x_{2t} | x_{1,t}, \theta)$ is available, compute $\hat{C}_0 = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N p(a_0, x_{2,0} | \tilde{x}_{1,0}^{(k)}, \theta)$ otherwise put $\hat{C}_0 = 1$.

(c) Set $x_{1,0:0}^{(k)} = \tilde{x}_{1,0}^{(k)}$ and $x_{1,0}^{(k)} = \tilde{x}_{1,0}^{(k)}$

2. For $t = 1, \dots, T$

(a) For each particle, draw $\tilde{x}_{1t}^{(k)}$ from the transition density

$$p(x_{1t} | a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta). \quad (31)$$

(b) Compute

$$\bar{v}_t^{(k)} = \frac{p(a_t | \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta) p(\tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t} | a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta)}{p(\tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)} | a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta)} \quad (32)$$

$$\hat{C}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_t^{(k)}$$

(Note that the draw pair is $(x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)})$ and the weight is $\bar{v}_t^{(k)} \frac{1}{N}$.)

(c) Set

$$\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)} = (x_{1,0:t-1}^{(k)}, \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}).$$

(d) Compute the normalized weights

$$\hat{w}_t^{(k)} = \frac{\bar{v}_t^{(k)}}{\sum_{k=1}^N \bar{v}_t^{(k)}}$$

(e) For $k = 1, \dots, N$ draw $x_{1,0:t}^{(k)}$ by sampling with replacement from the set $\{\tilde{x}_{1,0:t}^{(k)}\}$ according to the weights $\{\hat{w}_t^{(k)}\}$.

(Note the convention: Particles with unequal weights are denoted by $\{\tilde{x}_{0:t}^{(k)}\}$. After resampling the particles are denoted by $\{x_{0:t}^{(k)}\}$.)

(f) For use in (31) and (32) at the next iterate, set $x_t^{(k)}$ to the last element of $x_{1,0:t}^{(k)}$.

3. Done

(a) An unbiased estimate of the likelihood is

$$\hat{\ell}' = \prod_{t=0}^T \hat{C}_t \quad (33)$$

(b) s' is the last seed returned in Step 2e.

Systematic or stratified sampling can be used at step 2e instead of multinomial resampling. To use the alternative importance sampler of Section 4.5, replace (31) with (26) or (30) and replace (32) with

$$\bar{v}_t^{(k)} = \frac{p\left(a_t \mid \tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t}, \theta\right) p\left(\tilde{x}_{1,t}^{(k)}, x_{2,t} \mid a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta\right)}{f\left(x_{1,t}^{(k)} \mid a_{t-1}, x_{1,t-1}^{(k)}, x_{2,t-1}, \theta\right)}. \quad (34)$$

5 Computing the Posterior

In this section we let ℓ mean either ℓ of (10) or ℓ' of (11) as appropriate.

Metropolis algorithm is an iterative scheme that generates a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the posterior of θ . To implement it, we require the particle filter algorithm for drawing (ℓ, s) described in Section 4.6, a prior $\gamma(\theta)$, and a transition density in θ called the proposal density. For a given $\theta^\#$, a proposal density $\lambda(\theta^\#, \theta^*)$ defines a distribution of potential new values θ^* . We use the move-one-at-a-time, random-walk, proposal density that is built in to the public domain software that we use: <http://www.aronaldg.org/webfiles/emm/>. The algorithm for the Markov chain is as follows.

Start the chain at a reasonable value for θ and write to memory a draw $s^{\#\#}$ from the uniform density on a finite set of integers. Given a current $\theta^\#$ we obtain the next $\theta^{\#\#}$ as follows:

1. Draw θ^* according to $\lambda(\theta^\#, \theta^*)$.
2. Set s^* to $s^{\#\#}$ retrieved from memory.
3. Compute ℓ^* corresponding to (θ^*, s^*) using the particle filter in Section 4.6 and write to memory the $s^{\#\#}$ returned by the particle filter.
4. Compute $\alpha = \min\left(1, \frac{\ell^* \gamma(\theta^*) \lambda(\theta^*, \theta^\#)}{\ell^\# \gamma(\theta^\#) \lambda(\theta^\#, \theta^*)}\right)$.
5. With probability α , set $\theta^{\#\#} = \theta^*$, otherwise set $\theta^{\#\#} = \theta^\#$.
6. Return to 1.

The choice for the parameter N of the particle filter in Section 4.6 influences the rejection rate of the MCMC chain. If N is too small then $\mathcal{L}(\theta, s) = \ell^\#$ given by (33) will be a jittery estimator of $\mathcal{L}(\theta)$ which will increase the chance that the chain gets stuck. Pitt, Silva, Giordani, and Kohn (2012) show that what is relevant is the variance

$$\text{Var} \{ \log \mathcal{L}(\theta, s) \} = \int \left[\log \mathcal{L}(\theta, s) - \int \log \mathcal{L}(\theta, s) ds \right]^2 ds, \quad (35)$$

which can be computed from draws of $\ell^\#$ obtained by putting the filter in a loop. It is interesting that for an entry game such as in Subsection 6.1, the classification error rate can be so small that one is almost matching 0's and 1's and using the particle filter to solve backwards for $\{x_{1t}\}$ that will allow the match. The consequence is that N can be quite small. For our example, Pitt et. al.'s charts suggest that $N = 300$ will suffice. We actually use $N = 512$. In practice charts are unnecessary because one can easily determine N empirically by increasing it until the chain is no longer sticky.

One could set forth regularity conditions such that $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sup_\theta \text{Var} \{ \log \mathcal{L}(\theta, s) \} = 0$. They will be stringent: see Andrieu, Douced, and Holenstein (2010). One can argue that there is no point to verifying that variance declines with N because one must still determine the requisite N empirically. If an acceptable N is found, it does not matter if variance declines with N or not. If an affordable N cannot be found, a proof that variance declines with N does not help except to provide support for a request for more computing resources.

6 Examples

6.1 A Game with a Small Number of Players

In this section we describe an dynamic oligopolistic entry game. It is a modest variation on the game presented in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017), and the description in this section is based on and borrows from that paper. We present it here for completeness of exposition. However, for additional details regarding the motivation and rationale for the specification, computation of the model and its estimation, the reader is referred to that paper. Having described the game, we then test our proposed methodology with several simulation experiments.

At each market entry opportunity t the actions available to profit maximizing firm i are whether to choose to enter the market, $\tilde{E}_{it} = 1$, or decide to not enter $\tilde{E}_{it} = 0$. In what follows, a time period uniquely identifies a market opening therefore we interchangeably use t to denote a time period or a market entry opportunity associated with it. Firms can not always achieve entry decision profiles \tilde{E}_t . Rather, firms are aware that the realized entry profiles E_t follow a conditional distribution $p(E_t|\tilde{E}_t)$ given \tilde{E}_t . We use the following specification for $p(E_t|\tilde{E}_t)$

$$p(E_t|\tilde{E}_t, \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^I (p_e)^{\delta(E_{it}=\tilde{E}_{it})} (1-p_e)^{1-\delta(E_{it}=\tilde{E}_{it})}, \quad (36)$$

where $0 < p_e < 1$ and $\delta(a = b) = 1$ if $a = b$ and 0 if not. The intended outcome \tilde{E}_{it} is not observed by us. Instead E_{it} is observed, which is a Bernoulli random variable taking value \tilde{E}_{it} with probability p_e and value $1 - \tilde{E}_{it}$ with probability $q_e = 1 - p_e$. The number of entrants in market t is

$$Q_t = \sum_{i=1}^I E_{it} \quad (37)$$

To illustrate, consider the generic pharmaceutical drug market. The entry decision of firm i is $\tilde{E}_{it} = 1$ if the firm submits an application to the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and $E_{it} = 1$ if approved. The FDA reveals application approvals E_{it} ; submissions \tilde{E}_{it} are not revealed. Each application carries a small probability of being rejected by the FDA. Firms collectively decide on the equilibrium \tilde{E}_t . We observe the ex post realization of E_t .

The dynamics in the model come mainly through the evolution of costs based on past firm actions. The evolution of current total cost Z_{it} for firm i is determined by past entry decisions and random shocks. In the model estimated in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017), current entry can decrease the cost of an entry next period by, e.g., through learning by doing. However, in contrast in the simulations presented later in Section 6, the evolution of total costs will be configured to represent a situation where past entry constrains capacity and raises current total costs. The cost state variable evolves according to the actual outcome E_t rather than the intended outcome \tilde{E}_t . All firms know each others' costs and hence this is a game of complete information. We follow the convention that a lower case quantity denotes the logarithm of an upper case quantity, e.g., $Z_{it} = \log(z_{it})$, with the exception that

for the outcome both E and e denote variables that take the value zero or one. Log cost is the sum of two components

$$z_{i,t} = z_{u,i,t} + z_{k,i,t}. \quad (38)$$

We assume that $z_{u,i,t}$ cannot be observed by us and that $z_{k,i,t}$ can be observed. The first component follows a stationary autoregressive process of order one; the second accumulates the consequences of past entry outcomes:

$$z_{u,i,t} = \mu_z + \rho_z (z_{u,i,t-1} - \mu_z) + \sigma_z \epsilon_{it} \quad (39)$$

$$\begin{aligned} z_{k,i,t} &= \rho_e c_{k,i,t-1} + \kappa_e E_{i,t-1} \\ &= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho_e^j \kappa_e E_{i,t-j-1}. \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

In the above, ϵ_{it} is a normally distributed shock with mean zero and unit variance, σ_z is a scale parameter, κ_e is the effect of entry in market $t - 1$ on cost at market t , μ_z is the unconditional mean of the unobservable portion of log cost; ρ_z and ρ_e are autoregressive parameters that determine persistence. All firms are ex ante identical,⁷ with heterogeneity arising endogenously in the model depending on the effects of past actions on the total costs of the firms.

The total size of the market t or the lump sum total revenue in a market is denoted by S_t . It evolves according to the following process,

$$s_t = \mu_s + \sigma_s \epsilon_{I+1,t}, \quad (41)$$

where $s_t = \log(S_t)$, and the $\epsilon_{I+1,t}$ are normally and independently distributed with mean zero and unit variance. In (41), μ_s represents the long run average total revenue for all firms across all market opportunities, while σ_s is a scale parameter. In this example we assume revenue to be exogenous, however, in Section 7 we provide an example where revenue may be endogenously determined.

At time t a firm's present discounted value of profits is given by

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j E_{i,t+j} (S_{t+j}/Q_{t+j} - Z_{i,t+j}), \quad (42)$$

⁷One could allow the initial condition z_{i0} to vary by firm if desired.

where the discount factor is β . Each firm maximizes the present discounted value of its profit in each time period t conditioning on the equilibrium strategy profiles of its rivals.

For firm i 's dynamic problem at time t , the Bellman equation for the choice specific value function $V_i(\tilde{e}_{i,t}, \tilde{e}_{-i,t}, Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t)$ is,

$$\begin{aligned}
& V_i(\tilde{e}_{i,t}, \tilde{e}_{-i,t}, Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t) \\
&= \sum_{m_1=0}^1 p_E^{\delta(m_1=\tilde{e}_{1t})} (q_E)^{1-\delta(m_1=\tilde{e}_{1t})} \dots \sum_{m_I=0}^1 p_E^{\delta(m_I=\tilde{e}_{It})} (q_E)^{1-\delta(m_I=\tilde{e}_{It})} \left\{ m_i \left(\frac{S}{\sum_{j=1}^I m_j} - Z_{it} \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(\tilde{E}_{i,t+1}, \tilde{E}_{-i,t+1}, Z_{i,t+1}, Z_{-i,t+1}, S_{t+1}) \mid M_{i,t}, M_{-i,t}, Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t \right] \right\},
\end{aligned} \tag{43}$$

where $M_{i,t} = m_i$ and $M_{-i,t}$ is $M_t = (m_1, \dots, m_I)$ with m_i deleted.

For firm i at stage t of the game, $V_i(\tilde{e}_{i,t}, \tilde{e}_{-i,t}, Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t)$ is the expected payoff if it chooses $\tilde{e}_{i,t}$ and its rivals choose $\tilde{e}_{-i,t}$. A best response strategy profile $(\tilde{E}_{i,t}, \tilde{E}_{-i,t})$ for a stationary, pure strategy, Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game is one that satisfies the familiar (Nash) condition described above in Equation (4) in Section 3.

Since this is a game of complete information it implies that the equilibrium is known if the state that consists of the current total costs of all firms $(Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t})$ and total revenue S_t is known.

Using the above defined choice specific value function it is possible to compute the ex ante value function as follows,

$$V_i(Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t) = V_i(\tilde{E}_{i,t}, \tilde{E}_{-i,t}, Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t). \tag{44}$$

The ex ante value function satisfies the following Bellman equation

$$\begin{aligned}
& V_i(Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t) \\
&= \sum_{m_1=0}^1 p_E^{\delta(m_1=\tilde{E}_{1t})} (q_E)^{1-\delta(m_1=\tilde{E}_{1t})} \dots \sum_{m_I=0}^1 p_E^{\delta(m_I=\tilde{E}_{It})} (q_E)^{1-\delta(m_I=\tilde{E}_{It})} \left\{ m_i \left(\frac{S}{\sum_{j=1}^I m_j} - Z_{it} \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(Z_{i,t+1}, Z_{-i,t+1}, S_{t+1}) \mid M_{i,t}, M_{-i,t}, Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t \right] \right\}.
\end{aligned} \tag{45}$$

A comprehensive discussion of results for existence of equilibria in Markovian games is provided by Dutta and Sundaram (1998). Additional discussion may be found in Reny (1999). When the state space can only take on a finite set of values, Theorem 3.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) implies that the entry game has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies. Parthasarathy (1973) showed that this support condition can be relaxed to include a state space with countable values. The regularity conditions of Theorem 5.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) are closer to our model, i.e., that the revenue and cost do not have to be discrete but they do need to be bounded.

In our computations we rely on Theorem 5.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) because we are able to compute pure strategy equilibria for our model that has a continuous state space. The equilibrium profiles guaranteed by Theorem 5.1 depend on period t of the state vector and might depend on period $t - 1$ as well. We find that we can always compute pure strategy equilibria that depend only on period t of the state vector, and hence automatically satisfy the regularity conditions of Theorem 5.1. However, our model could also be transformed to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) that require the state space to be finite and countable. The proof of Theorem 3.1 of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) is significant for us because it relies on a dynamic programming approach that motivates our computational strategy.⁸

In the numerical computation we have always been able to find an equilibrium for each trial value of the parameters. Thus, computationally a bigger problem we encounter is multiplicity of equilibria. The assumption we make to resolve the issue of multiple equilibria is to adopt an explicit equilibrium selection rule. When we encounter multiple equilibria we adopt an explicit equilibrium selection rule as follows. We pick the equilibrium with the lowest aggregate costs (i.e., entrants are such that the most profitable production takes place). This idea is similar to that used by Berry (1992). That is, the strategy profiles \tilde{E}_t are ranked by aggregate cost in ascending order, $Z = \sum_{i=1}^I \tilde{E}_{it} Z_{it}$, and the first \tilde{E}_t that satisfies the equilibrium condition (4) is accepted as the solution. Note that our distributional

⁸More details about computing equilibria for this example are provided in the web version of the paper, http://www.aronaldg.org/papers/socc_web.pdf. However, the basic idea in computing \tilde{E}_t is that one uses (43) after substituting (44) to find the $\tilde{E}_{i,t}$ that satisfy the Nash condition (4). Then the Bellman equation (45) is used as a recursion to update $V_i(Z_{i,t}, Z_{-i,t}, S_t)$. One repeats until the terms on both sides of (45) are equal within a tolerance.

assumptions guarantee that no two Z can be equal so that this ordering of the \tilde{E}_t is unique. Moreover, none of the Z_{it} can equal one another. When this condition is met we have never had trouble in being able to compute a pure strategy equilibrium for any parameter value as soon as we compute a sufficient number of value function iterations.

Additional details about the computation of the model and our procedure to deal with multiple equilibria may be found in the web version of the paper. Like much of the literature on estimation and computation of dynamic games, overall, our method works conditional on the existence of an equilibrium being guaranteed. In the event of multiple equilibria it also works if there is a procedure available or if the econometrician is willing to make an assumption to deal with such multiple equilibria. As an example, in our case we use an explicit equilibrium selection rule based on economic criteria to account for multiple equilibria.

The parameters of the entry game model are given by

$$\theta = (\mu_z, \rho_z, \sigma_z, \mu_s, \sigma_s, \rho_e, \kappa_e, \beta, p_e). \quad (46)$$

The function that provides the decision profile is

$$\tilde{E}_t = H(z_{u,t}, z_{k,t}, s_t, \theta), \quad (47)$$

where $z_{u,t} = (z_{1,u,t}, \dots, z_{I,u,t})$; similarly $z_{k,t}$. The notation of the entry game maps to the notation of the generic game as follows

$$x_{1t} = z_{ut}$$

$$x_{2t} = (z_{kt}, s_t)$$

$$a_t = E_t$$

$$\begin{aligned} p(x_t | a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta) &= n[z_{ut} | \mu_z \mathbf{1} + \rho_z(z_{u,t-1} - \mu_z \mathbf{1}), \sigma_z^2 I] \\ &\quad \times \delta(z_{k,t} = \rho_e z_{k,t-1} + \kappa_e a_{t-1}) \\ &\quad \times n(s_t | \mu_s, \sigma_s^2) \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

$$p(x_{1,t} | a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta) = n[z_{ut} | \mu_z \mathbf{1} + \rho_z(z_{u,t-1} - \mu_z \mathbf{1}), \sigma_z^2 I] \quad (49)$$

$$p(a_t | x_t, \theta) = p[E_t | H(z_{u,t}, z_{k,t}, s_t, \theta), \theta] \quad (50)$$

$$p(x_{1,t} | \theta) = n[z_{ut} | \mu_z, \frac{\sigma_z^2}{(1 - \rho_z^2)} I] \quad (51)$$

In equations (50)

$$p[E_t | H(z_{u,t}, z_{k,t}, s_t, \theta), \theta] = p(E_t | \tilde{E}_t, \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^I p_E^{\delta(E_{i,t}=\tilde{E}_{i,t})} (1 - p_E)^{1-\delta(E_{i,t}=\tilde{E}_{i,t})}.$$

Hidden within $H(z_{u,t}, z_{k,t}, s_t, \theta)$ are equations (4), (43), and (44), which describe the computation of the value function and the search algorithm for the Nash equilibrium used to compute the decision profiles \tilde{E}_t from each $z_{u,t}$, $z_{k,t}$, and s_t .

The specialization of the formulas for the algorithm described in Subsection 4.6 to the game with a small number of players are as follows. Substituting (50) and (48) into the numerator of (32) and (49) into the denominator,

$$\bar{v}_t^{(k)} = p[E_t | H^f(z_{u,t}^{(k)}, z_{k,t}, s_t, \theta), \theta] n(s_t | \mu_s, \sigma_s^2) \delta[z_{k,t} = \rho_z z_{k,t-1} + \kappa_z H^f(z_{u,t-1}^{(k)}, z_{k,t-1}, s_{t-1}, \theta)]$$

For the alternative importance sampler,

$$\bar{v}_t^{(k)} = \bar{v}_t^{(k)} \frac{n[z_{ut}^{(k)} | \mu_z \mathbf{1} + \rho_z (z_{u,t-1}^{(k)} - \mu_z \mathbf{1}), \sigma_z^2 I]}{f(z_{ut}^{(k)} | z_{u,t-1}^{(k)}, z_{k,t-1}, s_{t-1}, \theta)}.$$

The expressions needed at Step 1 to compute \hat{C}_0 are given by (51) and (51).

6.2 A Game with a Large Number of Players

In the last section we verified our results using Monte Carlo simulations from a dynamic game of complete information with the Markov Perfect Equilibrium solution concept. However, the MPE solution concept is intractable when a game consists of a large number of players as the time to compute the solution to a game can increase exponentially with the number of players. In this section we show how our method applies to a game with a large number of players by following Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008) who develop the solution concept of Oblivious Equilibrium to deal with such games. Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008) show that this approach can be quite accurate in approximating the MPE solution for Ericson and Pakes (1995) type games with five or more players. To illustrate, we apply our method to one of the examples taken from Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2010), which has been used in applications that they cite.⁹

⁹We used their Matlab[®] code, for which we thank the authors, translated verbatim to C++. See http://www.columbia.edu/~gyw2105/GYW/GabrielWeintraub_files/programsMPE120726.zip.

The example is as follows. The set up is based on Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2010) and we only present the details that are relevant for our Monte Carlo analysis and refer the reader to that paper for additional details. The industry has differentiated products. Firm $i, i = 1, \dots, I$, produces at quality level x_{it} at time $t, t = 1, \dots, T$, where x_{it} is integer valued. For our simulation, $I = 20$. In period t consumer $j, j = 1, \dots, m$, receives utility

$$u_{ijt} = \theta_1 \ln \left(\frac{x_{it}}{\psi} + 1 \right) + \theta_2 \ln (Y - p_{it}) + v_{ijt},$$

where Y is income, p_{it} is price, $(\theta_1, \theta_2, \psi)$ are the utility function parameters, and v_{ijt} are distributed i.i.d. Gumbel. Each consumer buys one product, choosing the one that maximizes utility. For our simulation, $m = 50$. This is a logit model for which there is a unique Nash equilibrium $\{p_{it}^*\}$ in pure strategies that yields profit $\pi(x_{it}, s_{-i,t})$ to firm i , where $s_{-i,t}$ is a list of the states of its competitors. Each firm has an investment strategy $\iota_{it} = \iota(x_{it}, s_{-i,t})$, which is successful with probability $\frac{a\iota}{1+a\iota}$, in which case the quality of its product increases by one level. Quality depreciates by one level with probability δ . Our simulation concerns the parameters of the utility function and the transition dynamics, namely $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \psi, a, \delta)$, set as shown in Table 4 for our simulation, which are the same as in the Matlab code on the authors' website. There are a number of subsidiary parameters, mostly respecting $\iota(x, s)$, that have also been set to the values in the distributed Matlab code: discount factor $\beta = 0.95$, marginal investment cost $d = 0.5$, sunk entry cost $\kappa = 35$, entry state $x^e = 10$, average income $Y = 1$, marginal cost of production $c = 0.5$, and the utility of the outside good $u_0 = 0$. The oblivious equilibrium is computed by replacing $s_{-i,t}$ by its expectation under the stationary transition density for states. Details and the solution algorithm are in Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2010).

This game is mapped to our notation as follows. The state vector (5) at time t is comprised of the quality levels $\{x_{it}\}_{i=1}^I$. The state vector is known to all firms but not observed by us. It follows the Markov process described above which has a transition density represented as a transition matrix evolving according to the investment function and a stationary density represented as a vector, the elements for both of which are supplied by the solution algorithm. The transition matrix defines (8) and the vector of stationary probabilities defines (9). No portion of the state is observed by us so that (7) is the same as (8). The

measurement vector a_t is comprised of the number of customers that each firm attracts at time t . It follows a multinomial distribution whose parameters are a vector of probabilities, the elements of which are supplied by the solution algorithm, and the total number of customers m . This multinomial distribution is the density (6).

7 Simulation Experiments

To assess the efficacy of the approach proposed here that directly contradicts current practice in that the seed is random and the number of particles small, we conduct a simulation exercise.

7.1 Simulations for a Game with a Small Number of Players

We simulate the entry game described in Subsection 6 configured to represent the manufacture of a single object where entry constrains capacity. There are three firms. The time increment is one year. We set parameters according to the following considerations. A hurdle rate of 20% is a standard assumption in business which leads to a discount factor of $\beta = 0.83333$. Setting $p_a = 0.95$ seems intuitively reasonable and is in line with the estimates of Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017) who estimate a similar model from pharmaceutical data except that entry has the effect of reducing rather than increasing costs. We set $\rho_a = 0.5$, which gives the entry effect a half-life of six-months. Costs are usually persistent so $\rho_c = 0.9$ seems reasonable. The remaining parameters scale with μ_r . The parameter μ_r can be chosen arbitrarily because it is the log of the nominal price of the product. We chose $\mu_r = 10$. A gross margin of 30% puts $\mu_c = 9.7$. With $\kappa_a = 0.2$ the immediate impact of entry is to reduce the gross margin to 10%. The two scale parameters σ_c and σ_r are determined by the foregoing because, if one wants a sample that mimics competition to some extent, there is far less freedom in their choice than one might imagine. One can easily produce samples where one firm is dominant for long periods or a monopoly develops. By trial and error, we found $\sigma_c = 0.1$ and $\sigma_r = 2$ to be satisfactory. In general, σ_r must be fairly large, as it is here, to prevent a monopoly.

Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017) reported that p_a was estimated precisely and varying it within reason had little effect on estimates. Because the parameter was of no intrinsic

interest, they fixed it to reduce computational cost. We estimated with p_a both fixed and free to see if that held true here.

The firm's discount rate β is extremely difficult to estimate in studies of this sort (see e.g., Magnac and Thesmar (2002)). On the other hand it is not difficult to form priors for β . As mentioned above, a common rule of thumb in business is not to undertake a project whose internal rate of return is less than 20%. Theoretically, a firm should not undertake a project whose rate of return is less than its cost of capital. The historical risk premia for various industries are available (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)) to which one can add a nominal borrowing rate of 5% to arrive at a value for β . We estimated with β both fixed and free to assess the value of prior information regarding β .

The model is recursive due to (40). The customary way of dealing with this situation in time series analysis (e.g. GARCH models) is to run the recursion over initial lags prior to estimation. We set the number of initial lags to a large value $T_0 = 160$ to reduce effect of the choice of T_0 in our results. The choice of large T_0 was also motivated by the Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017) study where a structural break – a bribery scandal – gave rise to 160 initial lags that could be used to run the recursion (40) but could not be used for estimation. As in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017), we also pass (41) through the recursion as part of the likelihood which is equivalent to determining a loose prior for μ_r and σ_r from the initial lags. We simulated one long data set and from it constructed three data sets, small, medium, and large, with $T = 40, 120,$ and $360,$ respectively. The initial observations in a larger data set are the same as those of its smaller predecessor.

What we propose here is computationally intensive. Serial computation on a 2.9 MHz CPU takes about 8 hours per 5,000 MCMC repetitions for the medium size data set. Our code is not particularly efficient because it collects a lot of diagnostic information. Perhaps efficiency could be improved by 20% by removing these subsidiary computations. On the other hand, the computations are trivially parallelizable with linear scaling. The public domain code that we use, <http://www.aronaldg.org/webfiles/emm/>, has parallelization built in. Machines with 8 cores are nearly standard (two Intel[®] quad core chips). Machines with 48 cores (four AMD[®] twelve core chips) are available at a reasonable price. On a 48 core machine the computational cost would be 10 minutes per 5,000 MCMC repetitions.

We considered three cases keeping the data the same

1. The entry game model is fit to the data using a blind proposal and multinomial resampling. Estimates are in Table 1. Histograms of the marginals of the posterior density are in Figure 1 for the medium sample size. Figure 2 is the same with β constrained. Figure 3 shows the latent cost estimates for the medium sample size and β constrained.
2. The entry game model is fit to the data using an adaptive proposal and multinomial resampling. Estimates are in Table 2.
3. The entry game model is fit to the data using an adaptive proposal and systematic resampling. Estimates are in Table 3. Figure 4 shows the latent cost estimates for the medium sample size and β constrained.

The key parameter in the study of games of this sort is κ_a so we mainly focus on it although our remarks generally apply to the other parameters as well. In most respects our results are not surprising.

- A large sample size is better. In Tables 1 through 3 the estimates shown in the columns labeled “lg” would not give misleading results in an application.
- Constraining β is beneficial: compare Figures 1 and 2. The constraint reduces the bimodality of the marginal posterior distribution of σ_r and pushes all histograms closer to unimodality. In consequence, the descriptive statistics in the columns labeled “ β ” and “ $\beta \& p_a$ ” of Tables 1 through 3 represent the posterior distribution better than those in the columns labeled “Unconstrained.”
- Constraining p_a is irrelevant except for a small savings in computational cost: compare columns “ β ” and “ $\beta \& p_a$ ” in Tables 1 through 3.
- Improvements to the particle filter are helpful. In particular, an adaptive proposal is better than a blind proposal; compare Tables 1 and 2 and compare Figures 3 and 4. Systematic resampling is better than multinomial resampling; compare Tables 2 and 3.

Table 1 about here

Table 2 about here

Table 3 about here

Figure 1 about here

Figure 2 about here

Figure 3 about here

Figure 4 about here

7.2 Simulations for a Game with a Large Number of Players

The structure of the model is such that for each θ proposed in the MCMC chain, the oblivious equilibrium only needs to be computed once to provide the information to define the transition and observation densities. This allows one to have a large number of particles at minimal computational cost. It is as well because we found that $N = 8174$ was required to get the rejection rate down to a reasonable value. The particle filtering does not become a significant component of the computational cost up to $N = 32696$, which is the value we used for the results reported in Table 4. As seen from Table 4, the method we propose here is viable for this example thereby providing estimates of precision that the calibration methods that are often used with this model cannot.

Table 4 about here

8 Conclusion

We propose a Bayesian approach based on sequential importance sampling (particle filtering) to estimate the parameters of a dynamic model that can have state variables that are partially observed, serially correlated, endogenous, and heterogeneous. We illustrated by application to two examples. The first is a dynamic game of entry involving a small number of firms whose heterogeneity is based on their current costs due to feedback through capacity constraints arising from past entry. The second is an Ericson-Pakes (1995) style game with a large number of firms whose heterogeneity is based on the quality of their products with firms competing through investment in product quality that affects their market share and profitability.

Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. Our approach is based on deriving an unbiased estimate of the likelihood that is used within a Metropolis chain to conduct Bayesian inference. Unbiasedness guarantees that the stationary density of the chain is the exact posterior, not an approximation. This allows for tractable computation and feasible estimation of a dynamic model. In addition the latent state variables can be either discrete or continuous. Moreover, the approach permits endogenous feedback of past actions on the latent state variables that allows for heterogeneity among the players. Thus, our approach facilitates computation and estimation of dynamic games with either small or large number of players whose heterogeneity is affected by latent state variables, discrete or continuous, that are subject to endogenous feedback.

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A Appendix: Solving the Model

In the Appendix we describe a method for computing the equilibrium of a dynamic game of complete information given the observed and latent state variables and a set of parameter values. Because we consider infinite horizon models, we look for a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium which entails finding the fixed point of Bellman equations. Solving the base model is an intermediate step in computing the choice specific value function of the entry game model, i.e., the game with a small number of players. Therefore in the following we describe the solution method for the base model first and then discuss how the solution is used to solve the entry game with a small number of players.

The notation used here to describe the solution method is based on the game presented in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017). The description in this section borrows from that paper because our code was first developed in that context and uses that notation so we do not change notation here. For the reader's convenience, we repeat the description of the essentials of the generic game and the entry game with a small number of players in the notation of Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2017) rather than list all correspondences with the previous notation.

A.1 The Generic Game in Appendix Notation

There are I players, $i = 1, \dots, I$, who can choose action a_{it} at each time period t . Let $a_t = (a_{1t}, a_{2t}, \dots, a_{It})$. In an entry game with firms as players, if firm i enters at time t , $a_{it} = 1$; if not, $a_{it} = 0$. However, we do not require a_{it} , or any other variable for that matter, to be discrete. All variables in the game can be either discrete or continuous. To reduce the notational burden, we require each variable to be one or the other so that marginal distributions either put mass on a discrete set of points or on a continuum. Again for notational convenience, we will assume that continuous variables do not have atoms. The game is stationary. Time runs from $-\infty$ to ∞ ¹⁰. For the observed data time runs from $-T_0$ to T ¹¹. The state vector is $x_t = (x_{1t}, x_{2t})$. The state vector is observable by all players.

¹⁰A technical issue ignored in the submitted paper that is required for stationarity.

¹¹A technical issue ignored in the submitted paper. T_0 is actually used in the code to deal with initial lags for recursions.

We (the econometricians) only observe the second component x_{2t} . The game is indexed by a parameter vector θ that is known to the players but not to us. If the state is x_t , then players choose actions a_t according to the probability density function $p(a_t|x_t, \theta)$. Note that this formulation permits, among others, randomized strategies or ex. post. uncertainty, such as situations where there is a chance that a regulatory action reverses a decision to enter a market or that an acquisition reverses a decision not to enter. The transition density $p(x_t|a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta)$ governs the evolution of the state vector. We observe a_t .

Implicit above is an assumption that an algorithm to solve the game is available. As the analysis is Bayesian, one has some flexibility in handling nonexistence of equilibria. Because data are at hand, one can presume that an equilibrium must exist to give rise to the data. Therefore one can impose a prior that assigns zero support to any pairing of history and parameters for which the model being estimated does not have an equilibrium. If MCMC is used to estimate the model, as here, imposing this prior is quite easy: one rejects a pair for which an equilibrium does not exist so that it does not get added to the chain.

A.2 An Entry Game with a Small Number of Players in Appendix Notation

Firms maximize profits over an infinite horizon. Each time the market opens counts as one time increment. A market opening is defined to be an entry opportunity that becomes available to firms. Since a time period uniquely identifies a market opening, in what follows t is used interchangeably to denote a market opening or the time period associated with it. For simplicity, we assume that when a firm enters a market it realizes all the future payoffs associated with that market as a lump sum at the date of entry. We also assume that within the model market time rather than calendar time is what is relevant to discount factors and serial correlation.

The actions available to firm i when market t opens are to decide to enter, $A_{it}^E = 1$, or decide to not enter $A_{it}^E = 0$. Firms can not always achieve entry decision profiles A_t^E . Rather, firms are aware that the realized entry profiles A_t follow a conditional distribution $p(A_t|A_t^E)$

given A_t^E . We use the following specification for $p(A_t|A_t^E)$

$$p(A_t|A_t^E, \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^I (p_a)^{\delta(A_{it}=A_{it}^E)} (1-p_a)^{1-\delta(A_{it}=A_{it}^E)}, \quad (52)$$

where $0 < p_a < 1$ and $\delta(a = b) = 1$ if $a = b$ and 0 if not. The intended outcome A_{it}^E is not observed by us. Instead A_{it} is observed, which is a Bernoulli random variable taking value A_{it}^E with probability p_a and value $1 - A_{it}^E$ with probability $q_A = 1 - p_a$. The number of entrants in market t is

$$N_t = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it} \quad (53)$$

The primary source of dynamics is through costs. The evolution of current cost C_{it} for firm i is determined by past entry decisions and random shocks. Entry can increase the cost of an entry next period by, e.g., constraining capacity, or it can reduce cost, e.g., through learning by doing. The cost state variable evolves according to the actual outcome A_t rather than the intended outcome A_t^E . All firms know each others' costs and hence this is a game of complete information. We follow the convention that a lower case quantity denotes the logarithm of an upper case quantity, e.g., $c_{it} = \log(C_{it})$, with the exception that for the outcome both A and a denote variables that take the value zero or one. Log cost is the sum of two components

$$c_{i,t} = c_{u,i,t} + c_{k,i,t}. \quad (54)$$

We assume that $c_{u,i,t}$ cannot be observed by us and that $c_{k,i,t}$ can be observed. The first component follows a stationary autoregressive process of order one; the second accumulates the consequences of past entry outcomes:

$$c_{u,i,t} = \mu_c + \rho_c (c_{u,i,t-1} - \mu_c) + \sigma_c e_{it} \quad (55)$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_{k,i,t} &= \rho_a c_{k,i,t-1} + \kappa_a A_{i,t-1} \\ &= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho_a^j \kappa_a A_{i,t-j-1}. \end{aligned} \quad (56)$$

In the above, e_{it} is a normally distributed shock with mean zero and unit variance, σ_c is a scale parameter, κ_a is the immediate impact on cost at market t if there was entry in market $t - 1$, μ_c is the unconditional mean of the unobservable portion of log cost; ρ_c and ρ_a are

autoregressive parameters that determine persistence. All firms are ex ante identical,¹² with the effects of current decisions on future costs creating heterogeneity among firms. Stated differently, heterogeneity arises endogenously in the model depending on the past actions of the firms.

The total (lump sum) revenue to be divided among firms who enter a market at time t is $R_t = \exp(r_t)$, where r_t is given by

$$r_t = \mu_r + \sigma_r e_{I+1,t}, \quad (57)$$

where the $e_{I+1,t}$ are normally and independently distributed with mean zero and unit variance. In (57), μ_r is a location parameter representing the average total revenue for all the firms across all market opportunities and σ_r is a scale parameter. A firm's total discounted profit at time t is

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j A_{i,t+j} (R_{t+j}/N_{t+j} - C_{i,t+j}), \quad (58)$$

where β is the discount factor, $0 < \beta < 1$. A firm's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of its profit at each time period t taking as given the equilibrium strategy profiles of other firms. In this example we assume revenue to be exogenous, however, in Section 7 we provide an example where revenue may be endogenously determined.

The Bellman equation for the choice specific value function $V_i(a_{i,t}^e, a_{-i,t}^e, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t)$ of firm i 's dynamic problem at time t is

$$\begin{aligned} & V_i(a_{i,t}^e, a_{-i,t}^e, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \\ &= \sum_{l_1=0}^1 p_A^{\delta(l_1=a_{1t}^e)} (q_A)^{1-\delta(l_1=a_{1t}^e)} \dots \sum_{l_I=0}^1 p_A^{\delta(l_I=a_{I_t}^e)} (q_A)^{1-\delta(l_I=a_{I_t}^e)} \left\{ l_i \left(\frac{R}{\sum_{j=1}^I l_j} - C_{it} \right) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(A_{i,t+1}^E, A_{-i,t+1}^E, C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) \mid L_{i,t}, L_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right] \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

where $L_{i,t} = l_i$ and $L_{-i,t}$ is $L_t = (l_1, \dots, l_I)$ with l_i deleted. The choice specific value function gives the sum of current and future expected payoffs to firm i from a choice $a_{i,t}^e$ at time t explicitly conditioning on the choices that would be made by other firms $a_{-i,t}^e$ at time t under the expectation that firm i and the other firms would be making equilibrium entry decision

¹²One could allow the initial condition c_{i0} to vary by firm if desired.

choices, $A_{i,t+1}^E, A_{-i,t+1}^E$, respectively, from period $t + 1$ onward conditional on their current choices $a_{i,t}^e$ and $a_{-i,t}^e$. The expectation operator here is over the distribution of the state variables in time period $t + 1$ conditional on the realization of the time t state variables and the action profile L_t at time t . Therefore $V_i(a_{i,t}^e, a_{-i,t}^e, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t)$ is the expected payoff to firm i at stage t of the game if it chooses $a_{i,t}^e$ and the other firms choose $a_{-i,t}^e$. A stationary, pure strategy, Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game is defined by a best response strategy profile $(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E)$ that satisfies

$$V_i(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \geq V_i(a_{i,t}^e, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \quad \forall i \text{ and } a_{i,t}^e. \quad (60)$$

This is a game of complete information. Hence, if the state, which includes the current cost vector of all firms $(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t})$ and total revenue R_t , is known, then the equilibrium is known. Therefore, an ex ante value function can be computed from the choice specific value function

$$V_i(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) = V_i(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t). \quad (61)$$

The ex ante value function satisfies the Bellman equation

$$\begin{aligned} & V_i(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \\ &= \sum_{l_1=0}^1 p_A^{\delta(l_1=A_{1t}^E)} (q_A)^{1-\delta(l_1=A_{1t}^E)} \dots \sum_{l_I=0}^1 p_A^{\delta(l_I=A_{It}^E)} (q_A)^{1-\delta(l_I=A_{It}^E)} \left\{ l_i \left(\frac{R}{\sum_{j=1}^I l_j} - C_{it} \right) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) \mid L_{i,t}, L_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right] \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (62)$$

The parameters of the entry game model are given by

$$\theta = (\mu_c, \rho_c, \sigma_c, \mu_r, \sigma_r, \rho_a, \kappa_a, \beta, p_a). \quad (63)$$

The function that provides the decision profile is

$$A_t^E = S(c_{u,t}, c_{k,t}, r_t, \theta), \quad (64)$$

where $c_{u,t} = (c_{1,u,t}, \dots, c_{I,u,t})$; similarly $c_{k,t}$. The notation of the entry game maps to the notation of the generic game as follows

$$x_{1t} = c_{ut}$$

$$x_{2t} = (c_{kt}, r_t)$$

$$a_t = A_t$$

$$\begin{aligned} p(x_t | a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta) &= n[c_{ut} | \mu_c \mathbf{1} + \rho_c(c_{u,t-1} - \mu_c \mathbf{1}), \sigma_c^2 I] \\ &\quad \times \delta(c_{k,t} = \rho_a c_{k,t-1} + \kappa_a a_{t-1}) \\ &\quad \times n(r_t | \mu_r, \sigma_r^2) \end{aligned} \tag{65}$$

$$p(x_{1,t} | a_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, \theta) = n[c_{ut} | \mu_c \mathbf{1} + \rho_c(c_{u,t-1} - \mu_c \mathbf{1}), \sigma_c^2 I] \tag{66}$$

$$p(a_t | x_t, \theta) = p[A_t | S(c_{u,t}, c_{k,t}, r_t, \theta), \theta] \tag{67}$$

$$p(x_{1,t} | \theta) = n[c_{ut} | \mu_c, \frac{\sigma_c^2}{(1 - \rho_c^2)} I] \tag{68}$$

In equations (67)

$$p[A_t | S(c_{u,t}, c_{k,t}, r_t, \theta), \theta] = p(A_t | A_t^E, \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^I p_A^{\delta(A_{i,t}=A_{i,t}^E)} (1 - p_A)^{1-\delta(A_{i,t}=A_{i,t}^E)}.$$

Hidden within $S(c_{u,t}, c_{k,t}, r_t, \theta)$ are equations (59), (60), and (61), which describe the computation of the value function and the search algorithm for the Nash equilibrium used to compute the decision profiles A_t^E from each $c_{u,t}$, $c_{k,t}$, and r_t .

A.3 A Base Model

In the base model entry decisions are realized with certainty. The Bellman equation for the choice specific value function $V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t)$ of firm i 's dynamic problem at time t in the base model is

$$\begin{aligned} &V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \\ &= A_{it} (R_t/N_t - C_{it}) \\ &\quad + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(A_{i,t+1}^E, A_{-i,t+1}^E, C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) | A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right], \end{aligned} \tag{69}$$

where $-i$ represents the other players, costs and revenues evolve according to (54) through (57), and $N_t = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it}$. The choice specific value function gives the sum of current and future payoffs to firm i from a choice $A_{i,t}$ at time t explicitly conditioning on the choices that would be made by other firms $A_{-i,t}$ at time t under the expectation that firm i and the other firms would be making equilibrium choices, $A_{i,t+1}^E, A_{-i,t+1}^E$, respectively, from period

$t + 1$ onward conditional on their current choices. The expectation operator here is over the distribution of the state variables in time period $t + 1$ conditional on the realization of the time t state variables and the action profile at time t . Therefore $V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t)$ is the payoff to firm i at stage t of the game. A stationary, pure strategy, Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game is defined by a best response strategy profile $(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E)$ that satisfies

$$V_i(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \geq V_i(A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) \quad \forall i, t. \quad (70)$$

This is a game of complete information. Hence, if the state, which includes the current cost vector of all firms $(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t})$ and total revenue R_t , is known, then the equilibrium is known. Therefore, an ex ante value function can be computed from the choice specific value function

$$V_i(C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) = V_i(A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t). \quad (71)$$

The ex ante value function satisfies the Bellman equation

$$\begin{aligned} V_i(C_{it}, C_{-i,t}, R_t) & \\ &= A_{it}^E (R_t/N_t^E - C_{it}) + \beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_i(C_{i,t+1}, C_{-i,t+1}, R_{t+1}) \mid A_{i,t}^E, A_{-i,t}^E, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t \right], \end{aligned} \quad (72)$$

where $N_t^E = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it}^E$.

The entry decisions of all $i = 1, \dots, I$ firms for a market opening at time t are denoted by $A_t = (A_{1t}, \dots, A_{It})$. The strategy profile A_t at time t of the dynamic game is a function of the current period state variables (C_{1t}, \dots, C_{It}) and R_t . The vector of the log of the state variables at time t is

$$s_t = (c_{u1t}, \dots, c_{uIt}, c_{k1t}, \dots, c_{kIt}, r_t). \quad (73)$$

In particular, equations (69) and (72) can be expressed in terms of s_t using $C_{uit} = \exp(s_{uit})$ and $C_{kit} = \exp(s_{I+i,t})$ for $i = 1, \dots, I$ and $R_t = \exp(s_{2I+1,t})$. We describe the solution algorithm for a given parameter vector θ and a given state s_t at time t .

We begin by defining a grid on the state space which determines a set of $(2I + 1)$ -dimensional hyper-cubes. For each hyper-cube we use its centroid as its index or key K . A

state s_t within hyper-cube can be mapped to its key K .¹³ Let the vector $V_K(s_t)$ have as its elements the ex ante value functions $V_{i,K}(s_t)$, i.e., $V_K(s_t) = (V_{1,K}(s_t), \dots, V_{I,K}(s_t))$ (see equations (71) and (72)). To each K associate a vector b_K of length I and a matrix B_K of dimension I by $I + 1$. A given state point s_t is mapped to its key K and the value function at state s_t is represented by the affine function $V_K(s_t) = b_K + (B_K)s_t$.¹⁴ A value function $V_K(s_t)$ whose elements satisfy equation (72) is denoted $V_K^*(s_t) = b_K^* + (B_K^*)s_t$.

The game is solved as follows:

1. Given a state point s , get the key K that corresponds to it. (We suppress the subscript t for notational convenience.)¹⁵
2. Check whether the fixed point $V_K^*(s)$ of the Bellman equations (72) at this key has already been computed, i.e., whether the (b_K^*, B_K^*) for the K that corresponds to s has been computed. If not, then use the following steps to compute it.
3. Start with an initial guess of the ex ante value function $V_K^{(0)}(s)$. E.g., set the coefficients $(b_K^{(0)}, B_K^{(0)})$ to 0.
4. Obtain a set of points s_j , $j = 1, \dots, J$, that are centered around K . The objective now is to obtain the ex ante value functions associated with these points to use in a regression to recompute (or update) the the coefficients $(b_K^{(0)}, B_K^{(0)})$.
5. Ex ante value functions are evaluated at best response strategies. In order to compute these we must, for each s_j , compute the choice specific value function (69) at as many strategy profiles A as are required to determine whether or not the equilibrium condition in equation (70) is satisfied. In this process we need to take expectations to compute the continuation value $\beta \mathcal{E} \left[V_{K,i}^{(0)}(s_{t+1}) \mid A_{i,t}, A_{-i,t}, C_{i,t}, C_{-i,t}, R_t, \right]$ that appears

¹³Grid increments are chosen to be fractional powers of two so that the key has an exact machine representation. This facilitates efficient computation through compact storage of objects indexed by the key. The rounding rules of the machine resolve which key a state on a grid boundary gets mapped to, although lying on a boundary is a probability zero event in principle. The entire grid itself is never computed because all we require is the mapping $s \mapsto K$, which is determined by the increments, which is computed as needed.

¹⁴Keane and Wolpin (1997) adopt a similar approach for a single agent model. Our approach differs from Keane and Wolpin (1997) in that we let the coefficients of the regression depend on the state variables, specifically the key K , whereas Keane and Wolpin (1997) use an OLS regression whose coefficients are not state specific. Thus, our value function, unlike theirs, need not be continuous. Our value function can be thought of as an approximation by a local linear function.

¹⁵In fact, because it is a stationary game, the subscript t does not matter

in equation (69), where we have used equation (71) to express equation (69) in terms of $V_K^{(0)}(s)$. To compute expectations over the conditional distribution of the random components of next period state variables, we use Gauss-Hermite quadrature. To do this, we obtain another set of points centered around each s_j , i.e., s_{jl} , $l = 1, \dots, L$. These points are the abscissae of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule which are located relative to s_j but shifted by the actions A under consideration to account for the dynamic effects of current actions on future costs (see equation (56)). Expectations are computed using a weighted sum of the value function evaluated at the abscissae (more details are provided below).

6. We can now compute the continuation value at s_j for each candidate strategy A . We compute the best response strategy profile A_j^E corresponding to s_j by checking the Nash equilibrium condition (70). As just described, the choice specific value function evaluated at (A_j^E, s_j) is computed using $V_K^{(0)}(s)$ and equation (69), and denoted by $V_K^{(1)}(A^E, s_j) = (V_{1,K}^{(1)}(A^E, s_j), \dots, V_{I,K}^{(1)}(A^E, s_j))$.
7. Next we use the “data” $(V_K^{(1)}(A^E, s_j), s_j)_{j=1}^J$ to update the ex ante value function to $V_K^{(1)}(s_j)$. This is done by updating the coefficients of its affine representation to $(b_K^{(1)}, B_K^{(1)})$ via a multivariate regression on this “data” (as described in detail below).¹⁶
8. We iterate (go back to step 5) over the ex ante value functions $V_{i,K}^{(0)}(s), V_{i,K}^{(1)}(s), \dots$ by finding a new equilibrium strategy profile A^E for each s_j until convergence is achieved for the coefficients $(b_K^{(0)}, B_K^{(0)}), (b_K^{(1)}, B_K^{(1)}), \dots, (b_K^{(*)}, B_K^{(*)})$. This gives us $V_K^*(s) = b_K^* + (B_K^*)s$ for every s that maps to key K .

To summarize, the process of solving for the equilibrium begins with a conjecture ($b_K^{(l)} = 0, B_K^{(l)} = 0$) for the linear approximation of the value functions at a given state at iteration $l = 0$. These guesses are then used in computing the choice specific value functions at iteration $l + 1$ using equation (69). This computation involves taking expectations over the conditional distribution of the future state variables, which is accomplished using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature. Once we have the choice specific value functions we compute the

¹⁶ $V_K^{(1)}(A^E, s_j)$ will not equal $V_K^{(1)}(s_j)$ because the former is “data” and the later is a regression prediction.

equilibrium strategy profile at iteration $l + 1$ using equation (70). The best response strategy profile at iteration $l + 1$ is then used to compute the iteration $l + 1$ ex ante value functions via a regression that can be viewed as iterating equation (72). The iteration $l + 1$ ex ante value functions are then used to compute the iteration $l + 2$ choice specific value functions using equation (69), and the entire procedure is repeated till a fixed point of equation (72) is obtained. This iterative procedure solves the dynamic game. We next provide additional details about the steps of the algorithm described above to solve the model.

To describe the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure used in Step 5, note that if one conditions upon s_t and A_t , then a subset of the elements of s_{t+1} are independently normally distributed with means $\mu_i = \mu_c + \rho_c(c_{it} - \mu_c)$ for the first I elements, mean $\mu_{2I+1} = \mu_R$ for the last element, standard deviations $\sigma_i = \sigma_c$ for the first I elements, and standard deviation $\sigma_{2I+1} = \sigma_R$ for the last. The other I elements of s_{t+1} , $(s_{t+1,I+1}, \dots, s_{t+1,2I})$ are deterministic functions of s_t and A_{it} . Computing a conditional expectation of functions of the form $f(s_{t+1})$ given (A_t, s_t) such as appear in equations (69) and (72) is now a matter of integrating with respect to a normal distribution with these means and variances which can be done by a Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule that has been subjected to location and scale transformations. The weights w_j and abscissae x_j for Gauss-Hermite quadrature may be obtained from tables such as Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) or by direct computation using algorithms such as Golub and Welsch (1969) as updated in Golub (1973). To integrate with respect to $s_{i,t+1}$ conditional upon A_t and s_t the abscissae are transformed to $\tilde{s}_{t+1,i}^j = \mu_i + \sqrt{2}\sigma_i x_j$, and the weights are transformed to $\tilde{w}_j = w_j/\sqrt{\pi}$, where $\pi = 3.142$.¹⁷ Then, using a $2L + 1$ rule,

$$\mathcal{E}[f(s_{t+1}) | A_t, s_t] \approx \sum_{j_1=-L}^L \cdots \sum_{j_I=-L}^L \sum_{j_{2I+1}=-L}^L f(\tilde{s}_{t+1,1}^{j_1}, \dots, \tilde{s}_{t+1,I}^{j_I}, \tilde{s}_{t+1,2I+1}^{j_{2I+1}}, s_{t+1,I+1}, \dots, s_{t+1,2I}) \tilde{w}_{j_1} \cdots \tilde{w}_{j_I} \tilde{w}_{j_{2I+1}}.$$

¹⁷These transformations arise because a Hermite rule integrates $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) \exp(-x^2) dx$. Hence we need to do a change of variables to get our integral $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(\sigma z + \mu)(1/\sqrt{2\pi}) \exp(-0.5z^2) dz$ to be of that form. A change of variables puts the equation in the line above in the form $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(\sqrt{2}\sigma x + \mu)(1/\sqrt{\pi}) \exp(-x^2) dx$, which is where the expressions for $\tilde{s}_{t+1,i}$ and \tilde{w}_i come from.

If, for example, there are three firms and a three point quadrature rule is used, then

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{E}[f(s_{t+1}) | A_t, s_t] \\ & \approx \sum_{j_1=-1}^1 \sum_{j_2=-1}^1 \sum_{j_3=-1}^1 \sum_{j_7=-1}^1 f(\tilde{s}_{t+1,1}^{j_1}, \tilde{s}_{t+1,2}^{j_2}, \tilde{s}_{t+1,3}^{j_3}, \tilde{s}_{t+1,7}^{j_7}, s_{t+1,4}, \dots, s_{t+1,6}) \tilde{w}_{j_1} \tilde{w}_{j_2} \tilde{w}_{j_3} \tilde{w}_{j_7}. \end{aligned}$$

We use three point rules throughout. A three point rule will integrate a polynomial in s_{t+1} up to degree five exactly.¹⁸¹⁹

Step 7 involves updating the ex ante value function using a regression. We next describe how we do this. As stated above, we have a grid over the state space whose boundaries are fractional powers of two over the state space.²⁰ We approximate the value function $V(s_t)$ by a locally indexed affine representation as described above. For the the grid increments that determine the index of hyper-cubes we tried a range of values from 4 to 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables rounded to a nearby fractional power of two to scale the grid appropriately. The results are effectively the same. Hence in estimating the model we set the grid increments at 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables.²¹ We compute the coefficients b_K and B_K as follows. They are first initialized to zero. We then generate a set of abscissae $\{s_j\}$ clustered about K and solve the game with payoffs (69) to get corresponding equilibria $\{A_j^E\}$. We substitute the (A_j^E, s_j) pairs into equation (69) to get $\{V(A_j^E, s_j)\}_{j=1}^J$. Using the pairs $\{(V(A_j^E, s_j), s_j)\}$ as data, we compute b_K and B_K by multivariate least squares. We repeat until the b_K and B_K stabilize. We have found that approximately twenty iterations suffice for three firms and thirty for four firms²². The easiest

¹⁸If the \tilde{s}_{t+1} cross a grid boundary when computing (69) in Step 5, we do not recompute K because this would create an impossible circularity due to the fact that the value function at the new K may not yet be available. Our grid increments are large relative to the scatter of abscissae of the quadrature rule so that crossing a boundary will be a rare event, if it happens at all.

¹⁹Positivity is enforced by setting the value function to zero if a negative value is computed. If this does not happen at any quadrature point, which is easily detected by checking the most extreme point of the quadrature rule, then quadrature is not necessary and the conditional mean can be used as the integral.

²⁰Recall that grid increments are chosen to be fractional powers of two so that the key has an exact machine representation. This facilitates efficient computation through compact storage of objects indexed by the key.

²¹The set of keys that actually get visited in any MCMC repetition is about the same for grid increments ranging from 4 to 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables in our data. For a three firm game the number of hyper-cubes that actually are visited in any one repetition is about six.

²²An alternative is to apply a modified Howard acceleration strategy as described in Kuhn (2006); see also Rust (2006) and Howard (1960). The idea is simple: The solution $\{A_t^E\}$ of the game with payoffs (69) will not change much, if at all, for small changes in the value function $V(s)$. Therefore, rather than recompute the solution at every step of the (b_K, B_k) iterations, one can reuse a solution for a few steps.

way to get a cluster of points $\{s_j\}$ about a key is to use abscissae from the quadrature rule described above with s set to K and A set to zero. However, one must jiggle the points so that no two firms have exactly the same cost (see next paragraph for the reason for this). Of importance in reducing computational effort is to avoid recomputing the payoff (equation (69)) when checking equilibrium condition (70). Our strategy is to (temporarily) store payoff vectors indexed by A and check for previously computed payoffs before computing new ones in checking condition (70).

There will, at times, be multiple equilibria in solving the game. We therefore adopt an equilibrium selection rule as follows. Multiple equilibria usually take the form of a situation where one or another firm can profitably enter but if both enter they both will incur losses whereas if neither enters then one of them would have an incentive to deviate. We resolve this situation by assuming an explicit equilibrium selection rule. We pick the equilibrium with the lowest total cost, equivalently, maximum producer surplus²³. This idea is similar to that used by Berry (1992) and Scott-Morton (1999). That is, the strategy profiles A_t are ordered by increasing aggregate cost, $C = \sum_{i=1}^I A_{it}C_{it}$ and the first A_t that satisfies the equilibrium condition (70) is accepted as the solution. Note that our distributional assumptions on s_t guarantee that no two C can be equal so that this ordering of the A_t is unique. Moreover, none of the C_{it} can equal one another and when that is true failure to compute an equilibrium for a given θ and cost history is extremely rare. At worst all that happens is a few particles in the particle filter are lost (but replaced at the resampling step). The situation where all particles are lost thereby causing an MCMC proposal to be rejected has never occurred.

A.4 The Entry Game with a Small Number of Players

The solution method in the entry game model of Subsection A.2 is only different from that in the base model regarding how the conjectures of the ex ante value functions are being used to compute the choice specific value functions at each iteration using equation (59) instead of using equation (69). In addition to taking expectations over the conditional distribution of future state variables using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature for each action profile, the computation in the entry game model also needs to average over all the possible action

²³There would be a strong incentive to merge firms if this rule were too often violated.

profiles using the ex post error probabilities p_A and q_A according to the candidate member of the equilibrium action profile.

More specifically, only step 5 of the solution method in the base model needs to be modified for the entry game model. For each s_j , the choice specific value functions (59) instead of (69) should be computed at as many strategy profiles A as needed to seek an equilibrium that satisfies condition (60). Each of the terms within the curly bracket in (59) are computed exactly as in the base model, for each combination of L_{it} . However, instead of calculating them only as needed to compute the equilibrium as in the base model, all the terms are now pre-computed and stored prior to calculating the weighted sum in (59). Once these values are precomputed and stored, evaluating the left hand side of (59) for each candidate equilibrium action profile a_t^e only requires taking a weighted sum of the stored values, where the weights obviously depend on the action profile a_t^e .

The issue of multiple equilibria is handled in the same way as in the base model. The candidate equilibrium action profiles a_t^e are pre-sorted on ascending order of total costs. We start the search for the Nash equilibrium based on condition (60) from the lowest cost action profile, and stop once the first equilibrium is found.

Table 1. Parameter Estimates for the Small Game
Blind Proposal, Multinomial Resampling

Parameter	Constrained									
	Unconstrained			β			β & p_a			
value	sm	md	lg	sm	md	lg	sm	md	lg	
μ_z	9.70	10.10	9.72	9.68	9.94	9.67	9.68	9.86	9.72	9.68
		(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.06)
ρ_z	0.90	0.58	0.86	0.92	0.69	0.92	0.91	0.69	0.85	0.91
		(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.26)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.03)
σ_z	0.10	0.16	0.09	0.09	0.17	0.08	0.10	0.15	0.09	0.10
		(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.01)
μ_s	10.00	9.87	9.98	9.96	9.88	9.99	9.98	9.84	9.99	9.99
		(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.02)
σ_s	2.00	1.95	1.97	1.98	2.02	2.00	2.02	2.04	2.00	2.03
		(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.01)
ρ_e	0.50	0.76	0.56	0.58	0.59	0.57	0.56	0.76	0.57	0.52
		(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.04)
κ_e	0.20	0.04	0.24	0.19	0.15	0.26	0.20	0.14	0.22	0.22
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)
β	0.83	0.90	0.95	0.87	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
		(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)						
p_e	0.95	0.97	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)			

The data were generated according to the game with a small number of players with parameters set as shown in the column labeled “value”. For all data sets $T_0 = -160$. For the small data set $T = 40$; for the medium $T = 120$; and for the large $T = 360$. The estimate is the mean of the posterior distribution. The values below each estimate in parentheses are the standard deviation of the posterior. The prior is uninformative except for the following support conditions $|\rho_z| < 1$, $|\rho_e| < 1$, $0 < \beta < 1$, and $0 < p_e < 1$. The likelihood for μ_s and σ_s includes the observations from T_0 to 0. In the columns labeled constrained, the parameters β and p_e are constrained to equal their true values as shown in the table. The number of MCMC repetitions is 240,000 with every 25th retained for use in estimation.

Table 2. Parameter Estimates for the Small Game
Adaptive Proposal, Multinomial Resampling

Parameter	value	Unconstrained			Constrained					
		sm	md	lg	β			β & p_a		
		sm	md	lg	sm	md	lg	sm	md	lg
μ_c	9.70	10.00 (0.24)	9.82 (0.07)	9.77 (0.05)	9.93 (0.12)	9.74 (0.07)	9.70 (0.06)	9.85 (0.15)	9.73 (0.09)	9.65 (0.05)
ρ_c	0.90	0.95 (0.03)	0.85 (0.07)	0.87 (0.05)	0.87 (0.08)	0.92 (0.04)	0.93 (0.03)	0.87 (0.09)	0.92 (0.04)	0.94 (0.02)
σ_c	0.10	0.14 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.01)	0.12 (0.04)	0.08 (0.02)	0.08 (0.01)	0.12 (0.04)	0.09 (0.03)	0.08 (0.01)
μ_r	10.00	9.93 (0.06)	10.00 (0.02)	10.01 (0.01)	10.00 (0.05)	9.99 (0.02)	9.97 (0.02)	9.94 (0.07)	9.96 (0.03)	9.96 (0.03)
σ_r	2.00	1.93 (0.10)	1.98 (0.02)	1.99 (0.02)	2.01 (0.09)	1.98 (0.01)	2.00 (0.01)	2.03 (0.09)	1.97 (0.02)	1.99 (0.02)
ρ_a	0.50	-0.11 (0.21)	0.51 (0.09)	0.47 (0.06)	0.56 (0.17)	0.59 (0.06)	0.57 (0.06)	0.47 (0.20)	0.51 (0.07)	0.61 (0.05)
κ_a	0.20	0.19 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.17 (0.06)	0.21 (0.02)	0.18 (0.02)	0.24 (0.03)	0.20 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)
β	0.83	0.87 (0.10)	0.95 (0.03)	0.92 (0.04)	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
p_a	0.95	0.95 (0.01)	0.94 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.96 (0.02)	0.95 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.95	0.95	0.95

The data were generated according to the game with a small number of players with parameters set as shown in the column labeled “value”. For all data sets $T_0 = -160$. For the small data set $T = 40$; for the medium $T = 120$; and for the large $T = 360$. The estimate is the mean of the posterior distribution. The values below each estimate in parentheses are the standard deviation of the posterior. The prior is uninformative except for the following support conditions $|\rho_c| < 1$, $|\rho_a| < 1$, $0 < \beta < 1$, and $0 < p_a < 1$. The likelihood for μ_r and σ_r includes the observations from T_0 to 0. In the columns labeled constrained, the parameters β and p_a are constrained to equal their true values as shown in the table. The number of MCMC repetitions is 80,000 with every 25th retained for use in estimation.

Table 3. Parameter Estimates for the Small Game
Adaptive Proposal, Systematic Resampling

Parameter	value	Unconstrained			Constrained					
		sm	md	lg	β			β & p_a		
		sm	md	lg	sm	md	lg	sm	md	lg
μ_z	9.70	9.87 (0.24)	9.82 (0.07)	9.72 (0.05)	9.81 (0.12)	9.78 (0.07)	9.68 (0.06)	9.78 (0.15)	9.76 (0.09)	9.65 (0.05)
ρ_z	0.90	0.77 (0.03)	0.82 (0.07)	0.91 (0.05)	0.93 (0.08)	0.94 (0.04)	0.94 (0.03)	0.86 (0.09)	0.92 (0.04)	0.94 (0.02)
σ_z	0.10	0.14 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.09 (0.01)	0.14 (0.04)	0.08 (0.02)	0.08 (0.01)	0.11 (0.04)	0.08 (0.03)	0.08 (0.01)
μ_s	10.00	10.05 (0.06)	10.00 (0.02)	9.97 (0.01)	9.95 (0.05)	9.96 (0.02)	9.94 (0.02)	9.78 (0.07)	9.95 (0.03)	9.96 (0.03)
σ_s	2.00	1.94 (0.10)	1.99 (0.02)	1.99 (0.02)	1.93 (0.09)	1.97 (0.01)	2.01 (0.01)	2.07 (0.09)	1.98 (0.02)	1.97 (0.02)
ρ_e	0.50	0.61 (0.21)	0.53 (0.09)	0.56 (0.06)	0.41 (0.17)	0.36 (0.06)	0.61 (0.06)	0.71 (0.20)	0.58 (0.07)	0.64 (0.05)
κ_e	0.20	0.21 (0.02)	0.22 (0.03)	0.18 (0.02)	0.20 (0.06)	0.18 (0.02)	0.18 (0.02)	0.17 (0.03)	0.19 (0.02)	0.18 (0.02)
β	0.83	0.93 (0.10)	0.96 (0.03)	0.90 (0.04)	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
p_e	0.95	0.96 (0.01)	0.94 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.95 (0.02)	0.93 (0.01)	0.95 (0.01)	0.95	0.95	0.95

The data were generated according to the game with a small number of players with parameters set as shown in the column labeled “value”. For all data sets $T_0 = -160$. For the small data set $T = 40$; for the medium $T = 120$; and for the large $T = 360$. The estimate is the mean of the posterior distribution. The values below each estimate in parentheses are the standard deviation of the posterior. The prior is uninformative except for the following support conditions $|\rho_z| < 1$, $|\rho_e| < 1$, $0 < \beta < 1$, and $0 < p_e < 1$. The likelihood for μ_s and σ_s includes the observations from T_0 to 0. In the columns labeled constrained, the parameters β and p_e are constrained to equal their true values as shown in the table. The number of MCMC repetitions is 80,000 with every 25th retained for use in estimation.

Table 4. Parameter Estimates for the Large Game, Blind Importance Sampler, Stratified Resampling

Parameter	Value	Posterior	
		Mean	Std. Dev.
θ_1	1.00000	0.97581	0.04799
θ_2	0.50000	0.53576	0.07317
ψ	1.00000	1.01426	0.07070
a	3.00000	2.96310	0.06846
δ	0.70000	0.64416	0.05814

The data were generated according to the game with a large number of players with parameters for the consumer’s utility function and firm’s transition function set as shown in the column labeled “Value” and all others set to the values specified in Section 6.2. The number of firms is 20 and the number of consumers is 50. $T = 5$. The prior is uninformative except for a support condition that all values be positive. The number of MCMC repetitions is 109,000 and the number of particles per repetition is 32696.




Figure 1. Small Game, Unconstrained, Blind Proposal. Shown are histograms constructed from the MCMC repetitions for the column labeled “Unconstrained,” “md” in Table 1.




Figure 2. Small Game, β Constrained, Blind Proposal. Shown are histograms constructed from the MCMC repetitions for the column labeled “Constrained,” “ β ,” “md” in Table 1.




Figure 3. Small Game Cost Estimates, β Constrained, Blind Proposal. Shown are the particle filter estimates of each firm's unobserved computed from the MCMC repetitions for the column labeled "Constrained," " β ," "md" in Table 1. The dashed line is the true unobserved cost. At each MCMC repetition, $\bar{c}_{ut} = \sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{x}_{1t}^{(k)}$ is computed for $t = 0, \dots, T$; $T = 120$ and $N = 512$. The solid line is the average with a stride of 25 of the \bar{c}_{ut} over 240,000 MCMC repetitions. The dotted lines are ± 1.96 standard deviations about the solid line. The circles indicate that the firm entered the market at time t . The sum of the norms of the difference between the solid and dashed lines is 0.186146.




Figure 4. Small Game Cost Estimates, β Constrained, Adaptive Proposal. Shown are the particle filter estimates of each firm's unobserved computed from the MCMC repetitions for the column labeled "Constrained," " β ," "md" in Table 3. The dashed line is the true unobserved cost. At each MCMC repetition, $\bar{c}_{ut} = \sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{x}_{1t}^{(k)}$ is computed for $t = 0, \dots, T$; $T = 120$ and $N = 512$. The solid line is the average with a stride of 25 of the \bar{c}_{ut} over 80,000 MCMC repetitions. The dotted lines are ± 1.96 standard deviations about the solid line. The circles indicate that the firm entered the market at time t . The sum of the norms of the difference between the solid and dashed lines is 0.169411.